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ABSTRACT

CONGRESS, FRAMING, MEDIA AND
BANKRUPTCY REFORM, 1997-2005

Dollie Jane Greenwell
April 02, 2008

The purpose of this study is to analyze two Congressional decisionmaking models
and two policymaking models to identify which provides the strongest explanation of the
bankruptcy reform process between 1997 and 2005. The two models of Congressional
decisionmaking are the partisan model described by Mann and Ornstein and Binder's
institutional model.

The two policymaking models considered in this project are

Kingdon's revision of the "garbage can model" delineated in his work on policymaking,
and

Baumgartner and

policymaking research.

Jones'

punctuated equilibrium

model

described

in their

The Binder and Kingdon models provide the most accurate

description of the bankruptcy reform process largely due to their emphasis on internal
structures in the policymaking process.

Baumgartner and Jones overestimate of the

impact of the media's agenda setting role. Mann and Ornstein fail to explain the long
period of debate in Congress despite the legislation passing every floor vote.
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INTRODUCTION:

The process of reforming bankruptcy laws began in 1994 with the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, PL 103-394. The legislation provided for the creation of

the: National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC).

Rather than providing

suggestions for minor changes. the Commission released a 1,300 page report approved by
a 5-4 majority and included a scathing dissent. The resulting reforms spent a long and
difficult 8 years in Congress, incredibly attaining large margins of victory in nearly every
floor vote and maintaining nearly the same text.

This reform movement, however,

proved to be far more successful for Republicans than for Democrats.
Bankruptcy reform is an ideal case study of Congressional decisionmaking
because of the ideological reversal of the policy reforms and the clear differences
between the rhetoric of both parties on this issue.

The formation and adoption of

bankruptcy legislation differed from the traditional reform process due to Congress' sole
control of the reforms and the evolution of the text within each Congressional chamber.
Bankruptcy is an issue that many argue possesses elements of fiscal and social policy.
Furthermore, bankruptcy reform is a recurrent issue on the legislative agenda.

It is

included as an enumerated power in the Constitution (Article I, Section 8) and in 1898
Congress passed the first federal legislation creating a national bankruptcy system at the
bequest of the growing number of companies engaging in interstate commerce (Zywicki,
2003).

However, the law contained many more pro-debtor and pro-lawyer provisions

than corporations expected (Zywicki, 2003).

Zywicki (2003) argues these "friendly"

provisions have influenced bankruptcy law ever since and established judges and lawyers
as the traditional experts for policy questions in bankruptcy legislation.

By the late

1970's creditors once again brought bankruptcy reform back to the table and the 1978
reforms created a bankruptcy system that was more accessible and attractive to both
individuals and corporations, once again establishing lawyers and judges as the dominant
actors and the primary winners in the resulting legislation (Zywicki, 2003). Bankruptcy
will always be an important issue to the credit industry, businesses both small and large,
and according to the NBRC report an increasing number of consumers (pp. 77-78).
This study attempts to identify an appropriate policy model that can explain the
formation and adoption of bankruptcy reform.

Kingdon (1995) develops a model that

explains policy change when "process streams" combine. The punctuated equilibrium
model, developed by Baumgat1ner and Jones (1993)' attempts to explain long periods of
policy stability with intervening reform movements that occur quickly when policy
subsystems disintegrate and new subsystems develop to take its place. However, Mann
and Ornstein (2006) argue that this period of bankruptcy reform is a consequence of
Republican control of both houses of Congress and the Presidency. In addition, Binder
(1999) contends that policymaking in Congress can be best understood from an
institutional perspective, suggesting that bicameralism plays a large role in the policy
formation process.
This project includes an analysis of the Democratic and Republican frames,
coding of news articles directly addressing bankruptcy reform proposals according to
frame, and an analysis of the legislative proposals for bankruptcy reform from the lOSlh
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Congress to the 109 Congress. The information collected in this study is applied to the
models listed above to determine which provides the explanation most similar to the
reform process.
Because Congress drove the bankruptcy reform agenda rather than the media or
other forces outside government this study incorporates evidence from Congressional
decision making literature to attempt to explain the reform process.

The two

Congressional decision making models are Mann and Ornstein's partisan model and
Binder's institutional model. The partisan model suggests the majority party in Congress
determines the direction of policy and the strength of the partisan coalition determines the
speed with which the legislation is passed and the amount of compromise the legislation
will reflect (Mann & Ornstein, 2006). Binder's institutional model argues that division
between the chambers will determine the success or failure of legislation in Congress
(Binder, 1999).
Binder's account of Congressional decisionmaking most closely aligns with the
bankruptcy reform process because the eight-year stalemate over bankruptcy legislation
reflects the failure of House and Senate leaders to corne to a compromise. The Senate
legislation tended to include more Democratic provisions. while the House legislation
consistently represented Republican principles.

In 1997, there was a vast difference

between the legislation offered by the Senate and the legislation offered by the House.
Even though the House was able to pass reforms in every Congressional session, Housemembers had to wait until the Republican leadership in the Senate was strong enough to
build a coalition to pass bankruptcy reform.

Although, the Congressional decision

making models do not offer a complete explanation of policymaking they make important
theoretical contributions to the study of policy.
The two policymaking models analyzed are Kingdon's revision of the "garbage
can model" and the punctuated equilibrium model.

Kingdon's model is the most

explanatory when applied to the bankruptcy reform process.

Kingdon emphasizes the

internal actors within policy communities. Baumgartner and Jones contend that outside
actors, such as the media and interest groups playa larger role than Kingdon suggests.
The media does not have the impact that Baumgartner and Jones suggest in their
research. In the case of bankruptcy reform, the media does not retlect the same interests
represented in Congressional committee hearings and reports. The media instead rely on
the traditional experts of bankruptcy policy representing the old policy community rather
than the new community gaining influence with Congressional decision-makers.

POLICY MAKING IN THE US CONGRESS:

This study attempts to combine two separate literatures on policymaking and
Congressional decision making.

Because the bankruptcy reforms took place in the

Legislative branch. it was necessary to include a discussion of Congressional
decisionmaking theories. The institutional model offered by Binder (1999) provides the
strongest explanation for the bankruptcy reform process and the Kingdon (1995) model
provides the best description from policymaking literature. The partisan model offered
by Mann and Ornstein (2006). fails to account for the many bipartisan votes cast in the
Senate and cannot explain the length of time the legislation spent in Congress.
Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) punctuated equilibrium model places too much weight on
the media's agenda setting role and actors outside of government.

Po/icYllwking Literature
Policymaking is a difficult issue to study in political science. Until recently. the
development of general measures for agenda setting and modeling the many facets of the
decisionmaking process presented an intractable problem for scholars in this field.
Kingdon (1995) revises the Cohen-March-Olsen. "garbage can model." originally
developed to analyze organizational choice. to apply to agenda setting in public policy.
Kingdon ( 1995) adopts the properties that describe institutions. participants: have a vague
understanding of their own preferences, fail to comprehend the processes through which

decisions are made, and flow in and out of the decision making process easily and often
(pp. 84). However, Kingdon (1995) modifies the process streams, which he identifies as
problem recognition. policy formation, and political atmosphere (pp. 86-87).
Kingdon's problem stream indicates that problem recognition occurs through
quantitative or qualitative indicators such as focusing events or feedback mechanisms
(Kingdon. 1995, pp. 90-115). Policy formation takes place within policy communities,
which determine the policy alternatives and determine proposals (Kingdon, 1995, pp.

116-143). The political atmosphere incorporates forces within government and popular
support to take into account factors such as interest groups, public opinion. and elections
(Kingdon, 1995. pp. 145-164). When process streams couple, policy change becomes
possible (Kingdon, 1995. pp. 87).
Baumgartner and Jones (1991) develop the punctuated equilibrium policy-making
model to explain periods of rapid policy reversals separated by long periods of stability
within a policy arena.

Changes in rhetoric combine with changes in policy venue to

create a change in the image of the policy itself (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). This
process gains momentum and creates a self-reinforcing, positive feedback mechanism
that leads to new policy subsystems, resulting in new problem definitions and eventually
reversals in policy (Baumgartner & Jones. 1991).
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) identify five indicators of subsystem breakdowns:
media attention. venue access, nature of the problem, policy outputs, and secular change
in institutional structures (pp. 50-55). BaumgaI1ner and Jones' (1991) rely largely on the
premise that either concurrent with or soon following the destruction of a policy
subsystem there must be a new system developing and lying wait for a chance to redefine

the policy problem.

When an event occurs that demonstrates weakness or possible

problems, Baumgartner and Jones (1991) predict a flurry of negative media attention
focusing on the old policy and the actors who created the system, or positive attention
focusing on the developing subsystem actors and policy. The negative media attention is
more important than positive attention according to Baumgartner and Jones (1991). The
coding scheme applied by Baumgartner and Jones is very broad.

In order to provide

evidence of agenda setting, they include a count of all articles relating to the policy issue
and code only the headline (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, pp. 50-51).
Venue access acts as an indicator of the
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, pp. 52-53).

governmental policy agenda

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have an

expansive characterization of what measures can act as venue access indicators. They
include not only all legislative and executive branch activities, but activities at the state
and local level and looking at financial markets for evidence of regulatory policy
outcomes (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, pp. 52-53).
The nature of the problem is included in the analysis to account for the increasing
or possible decreasing severity of a policy problem (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, pp. 53).
The fourth indicator, policy outputs. refers to changes made in the structure of
policymaking that lead to policy change, expenditures by governmental departments, and
changes in governmental activities (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, pp. 54).

Examples

given by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) include the dismantling of the Atomic Energy
Commission, which lead to changes in nuclear policy (pp. 54).

The final indicator

provided by Baumgartner and] ones (1993), is the change in institutional structures over
time, which attempts to account for cultural and contextual changes in policy issues over
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time (pp. 55). Because of the period in which the reform of bankruptcy laws took place,
an important structure is partisanship.
While the Kingdon (1995) model differs in many ways from the punctuated
equilibrium modeL the strongest point of contention is the influence of actors outside
government on the agenda setting process. Kingdon (1995) argues that interest groups,
consultants, academics. researchers. and members of the media do not have a significant
effect on setting the governmental agenda (pp. 67-70).

Participants outside the

government are also not likely to attain suggested policy alternatives, but are more
successful in blocking alternatives from consideration (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 67-70). This
is a much more limited role than many other scholars suggest.
Recent research in agenda setting has begun to develop models incorporating
agenda setting and framing (Jasperson et a!., 1998; McCombs. 1997). McCombs (1997)
develops a continuum of journalistic involvement in agenda setting ranging from the
passive professional detachment, to targeted involvement, boosterism, and finally
proactive agenda setting. The proactive agenda setting stage describes a situation where
the media not only act as active agenda setters, but also actively participate in the
development of frames (McCombs, 1997). McCombs' (1997) study looking at first and
second-level agenda setting in Charlotte and San Antonio demonstrated the media had a
startling effect on the community. In San Antonio, a local newspaper began to publish
goals for city spending for children' s issues on their editorial page and within a year the
funding for those programs increased 14?r (McCombs. 1997). The situation in Charlotte
involved a series of investigative reports in the local newspaper. which prompted record
turnout levels in the next election (McCombs, 1997). Jasperson et a!. (1998) contend that

studies of the salience of agendas should include a content analysis of the issue frames to
get a more accurate description of causes of shifting public opinion about issues.
Chyi and McCombs (2004) study framing over the "life-span" of a news event
and argue that the media can define the salient aspects of an event by what they
emphasize

In

news stories.

This study examines New York Times coverage of the

Columbine school shootings and attempts to understand how frames evolve over time
(Chyi & McCombs, 2004). With this research, Chyi and McCombs (2004) attempt to
add time and space dimensions into the study of framing effects. Space is defined as the
level of analysis, ranging from the individual (micro) to community, region, society, and
finally the international (macro) level of analysis (Chyi & McCombs, 2004). Time refers
to the variation in time-period news stories emphasize, from a historical perspective to
stories predicting future events (Chyi & McCombs, 2004). Chyi and McCombs (2004)
conclude that the media emphasize different aspects of a news story across the life-span
of the issue to keep the issue interesting and alive.

In her seminal work on the social construction of news, Tuchman (1978)
describes the media as a "social institution," that not only disseminates information to the
public but also has relationships with other institutions and institutional norms for those
working within the system (pp. 4-5). This process promotes the status quo in society by
defining what is important to people and defining deviant behavior (Andsager & Powers,
1999; Ashley & Olsen, 1998; Boyle et al.. 2005; Tuchman, 1978, pp. 4-5, pp. 182-185).

This does not imply the structure of society produces the norms of social behavior; social
meanings and the construction of behavioral norms requires constant definition and
redefinition, construction and reconstruction. which reinforces the consistent aspects and

l)

recreates the inconsistencies (Tuchman, 1978, pp. 182-185).

According to Tuchman

(1978, pp. 183)' "as newsworkers simultaneously invoke and apply norms, they define
them." Those working in media must constantly re-evaluate their interpretive decisions
to ensure equal representation of perspectives and equal treatment for all sides of an issue
(Tuchman, 1978, 183-185).
Another important aspect of this line of research is the media autonomy model
developed by Terkildsen, Schnell, and Ling (1998) to disentangle the relationships
between the media, interest groups. and political elites. This model regards journalists as
the gatekeepers of information, allowing facts and interpretations of issues that
correspond with the traditional news narrative style or with their own personal views to
pass, while keeping information that lacks these values from reaching the general public
(Terkildsen et al.. 1998). Political actors are able to take advantage of the influences in
three ways: through message structure, rhetoric, and source cues (Callahan & Schnell,
2001; Terkildsen et aI., 1998).
Message structure includes the use of interpretive packages. framing, and issue
dualism (Callahan & Schnell, 2001: Terkildsen et aI., 1998). In this context, interpretive
packages refer broadly to groupings of frames that work together to reinforce issue
sallience and structure the meaning of an argument (Terkildsen et aI., 1998). Successful
packages usually have a narrative structure and the ability to coherently incorporate new
information in to the package (Gamson & Modigilani, 1989; Graber, 1989). Framing
refers to political actors' use of storylines and narratives to reinforce the salience of
particular attributes of issues and debates (Gamson & Modigliani. 1989; Graber, 1989;
Terkildsen et a1., 1998). Issue dualism is a concept that describes media actions to appear
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objective. According to the hypothesis of issue dualism, journalists report statements
from at least two sides of an issue regardless of expertise or factual content to appear to
be reporting the objective truth (Terkildsen et aL 1998). When policy elites frame issues
in terms of the message structure employing interpretive packages and taking advantage
of issue dualism, the media generally repOlt the frame in its entirety (Callahan & Schnell,
2001 ).
Rhetoric refers to the use of symbols and metasymbols by political actors
(Callahan & Schnell, 2001; Terkildsen et aI., 1998). The study applies the definition of
symbols from Gamson and Mondigliani (1987), "metaphors, catchphrases, and other
condensing symbols," (Terkildsen et aI., 1998, pp. 48). However, symbols are just as
likely to be visual as they are verbal Terkildsen et aI. (1998) provide the example of the
American flag and pictures of enthusiastic crowds as two very common symbolic images
in politics. Metasymbols are media prescribed labels for groups that generally encourage
an "insider vs. outsider" debate and provide some groups with more power than others
(Callahan & Schnell, 2001; Terkildsen et aI., 1998).

Although the use of message

rhetoric by political elites delegates a lot of interpretive power to the media, it can
occasionally be beneficial to groups, particularly if they can take advantage of
metasymbols (Callahan & Schnell, 2001; Terkildsen et aI., 1998).
Policy elites have the least control over the representation of sources in the media
(Terkildsen et aL 1998). Terkildsen et aI. (1998) define source cues to include citations
from sources and descriptions of sources that can take either positive or negative forms.
Source citations can refer to either an interview with a source or less commonly in news
stories, documents provided by sources (Callahan & Schnell, 2001; Terkildsen et
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aI., 1998 J. Source descriptors refer to the ways in which the media portray sources and in
particular, the language used to describe them (Callahan & Schnell, 2001: Terkildsen et
aI.,1998).
Political elites have a natural advantage in gaining media attention, especially in
public policy debates (Callahan & Schnell, 200 I: Druckman, 200 I).

Callahan and

Schnell (2001) suggest that due to the authority and accessibility of policy makers, their
frames are more likely to get media coverage and their coverage is more likely to be
unedited. However, Callahan and Schnell (2001) caution that the ability to gain media
coverage is qualified by the policy maker's "status, credibility, and organizational
resources," (pp. 188).

Druckman (200 I) echoes this sentiment.

However, unlike

Callahan and Schnell (2001 J. Druckman (200 I) argues that this is the case because
citizens delegate political decisions to credible elites.

Decisiol1ll1akillg ill Congress
Recent scholarship analyzing the institutional relationship between the House of
Representatives and the Senate provide evidence that partisanship is superseding the
"institutional ambition" so carefully constructed in the Constitution.

The House and

Senate have changed dramatically since the drafting of the Constitution and the founders
could never have imagined the scope of issues the federal government manages, the
expansion of executive power. and the new role of the media in the policymaking
process. This study hopes to add to current research analyzing whether these changes
have altered the nature of legislative power.
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Within each Congressional chamber, the majority party often creates rules and
exploits procedural control to establish strategic coalitions and relationships within
committees that solidify and maintain policy subsystems (Schickler & Rich, 1997).
There is general agreement among recent studies on the U.S. Congress that the
institutional differences between the House and Senate increase the likelihood of the
House producing extreme legislation and moderate legislation being more successful in
the Senate (Evans and Lipinski, 2005). There is also considerable research arguing that
partisanship has been on the rise since the Republicans won control of Congress in the
1994 elections (Dodd and Oppenheimer, 2005; Gershtenson, 2006; Smith and Gamm,
2005).
Mann and Ornstein argue that intense partisanship has lead a unified Republican
party to subordinate the legislative process to dictates from the executive branch, and
offers that as evidence of the institutional decline of Congress (2006; pp. 212-4). Mann
and Ornstein (2006) portray the Republican controlled Congress and Presidency as a
pseudo-parliament and accuse Republican Congressional leaders of using rules and
procedures to circumvent the legislative process.

The source of this problem is the

growing polarization within the population and the recruitment of more polarizing
politicians to appeal to those voters (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, pp. 224-6). As a result,
policy making in Congress is less deliberative and the policy outcomes reflect the lack of
thought put into them (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, pp. 212-4).
Dodd and Oppenheimer (2005) stress the impact on the rule changes occurring
after Newt Gingrich [R-GA] assumed the role of Speaker in the House.

When the

Republicans claimed control of the House after the 1994 elections, the leadership
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changed House rules to allow the Speaker to assIgn chairs. rather than the more
decentralized approach of the Democrats in which seniority was the deciding factor in the
designation of committee chairs (Dodd & Oppenheimer. 20(5). The new rules regarding
committee leadership also limited chair positions to three terms preventing other
members from achieving political standing to make them capable of challenging House
leadership (Dodd & Oppenheimer. 2(05). These rules allowed Gingrich and other House
leaders unfettered agenda control, which Gingrich used to unify the party and increase the
political standing of the party (Dodd & Oppenheimer, 20(5).
Even though it was not long before Gingrich resigned his House seat, the rule
changes instituted under his leadership established the most powerful House speaker
position since 1910 (Dodd & Oppenheimer, 2005). According to Schickler and Pearson
(2005), Dennis Hastert [R-IL] has successfully expanded the rules established by his
predecessor, Gingrich. However, Schickler and Pearson (2005) include the Democratic
response to Republican unification in their analysis and contend that the increasing
unification of the Republican Party in the House precipitated an increasing unification of
the Democratic Party.

Furthermore, the expansion of Republican dominance to the

executive branch decreases the incentive of House Republicans to make policy
concessions to Democrats (Schickler & Peaerson, 2(05).
Although some focus on the moderation of the Senate compared to the House,
Sinclair (2005) presents another picture of the modern C.S. Senate.

Sinclair (2005)

describes the evolution of perceptions of the Senate from the 1950's when much of the
policy process occurred behind closed doors in committees, then the 1970's when the
public regarded Senators as independent actors pursuing individual policy goals. Sinclair

1-1-

(2005) depicts Senators as partisan players working in coalitions to thwart maneuvers of
the opposing party, while at the same time demonstrating great respect for fellow
members and the institution by allowing some pieces of legislation to pass without
incident.
Senate rules and traditions allowing significant freedom to individual members,
such as the filibuster and the more informal "hold:' grant individual Senators the power
to hinder and in many cases prevent a piece of legislation from obtaining a floor vote. On
the other hand, Sinclair (2005) also notes the remarkable restraint shown by members
when they allow a piece of legislation they dislike to receive a favorable vote in the
chamber. Sinclair (2005) states. "Most of the time, the Senate manages to maintain the
minimum restraint and cooperation necessary to avoid total gridlock, yet the chamber
regularly seems to teeter on the precipice of legislative breakdown" (pp. \9-20).
Poole (2007) uses the NOMINATE dataset to analyze the voting patterns of
individual members of Congress and finds it is extremely rare for elected members of
Congress to change their ideological positions. However, it is difficult to apply datasets
to the liberal-conservative ideological continuum because liberal and conservative
ideologies are not always logically consistent, particularly across issues (Poole, 2007).
Snyder and Groseclose (2000) attempt to measure party influence in roll call voting
across several issues. They find that there is little variation in partisan behavior between
chambers (Snyder & Groseclose, 2000).

There is variation, though in party influence

across issue types (Snyder & Groseclose, 2000). Budget resolutions, tax policy, social
security, social welfare, and the national debt limit are the issues with the most partisan
voting behavior (Snyder & Groseclose, 2000).
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On the other hand, Binder (1999) argues that intrabranch conflicts in Congress are
more likely to derail the policy process than partisan differences between the legislative
and executive powers.

Binder (1999) presents eight hypotheses regarding gridlock in

government: divided government, percentage of moderates, ideological diversity, amount
of time since the majority party previously held majority status, ideological distance
between the chambers, severity of filibuster threat, budgetary situation, and policy mood.
The strongest indicator of gridlock is the ideological distance between the chambers
(Binder, 1999).
Tsebelis (1995) studies bicameralism from a comparative perspective and
analyzes differences in policy stability across countries with unicameral and bicameral
legislatures. Among his findings. Tsebelis (1995) argues that bicameralism establishes
an additional veto point for legislation. which decreases the likelihood of extreme
reforms. The United States has three "veto players" because a bill must receive approval
by both houses of Congress and the President before it becomes a law (Tsebelis, 1995,
pp. 310).

According to Tsebelis (1995). this system diminishes the impact of

Congressional elections because it would take a substantial electoral change to alter both
chambers to a degree that would facilitate changes in policy. However, Tsebelis (1995)
includes the qualification that party unity between "veto players" is likely to alter the
institutional relationship.
Mann and Ornstein (2006) discuss the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 as an ideal example of the ascendancy of partisanship
in Congressional policymaking and the institutional decline of the legislative branch (pp.
141).

Congress spent eight years deliberating and debating the provisions of this
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legislation without being able to come to a consensus that can pass both houses of
Congress and receive Presidential approval. Surprisingly, with two months and a little
prodding by the Republican leadership, Congress was able to pass a law that is
remarkably similar to its earliest 1998 version. The law incorporates a few provisions
that developed in the debate and leaves a few notable provisions aside.

Mann and

Ornstein (2006) highlight the firestorm of debate that took place after Hurricane Katrina
hit New Orleans in September of 2005 only a few weeks before the legislation would
take effect. Mann and Ornstein argue that because of the failure of Congress to properly
deliberate and compromise in this legislation, the law is essentially flawed and needs
reform (2006, pp. 141-147).
The means testing procedure included in the legislation requires anyone earning
more than the state median income 180 days before they file for bankruptcy or capable of
repaying more that 257c of their non-dischargable debt without undue hardship, to file
additional paperwork to demonstrate "special circumstances," to file under Chapter 7
(U.S. House Report, 2005, pp. 15-17). This provision creates difficulties for victims of
natural disaster who may not have the necessary paperwork to prove their special
circumstances and might not be able to wait 180-days, after losing a job and relocating, to
file for bankruptcy to avoid the means test.

Hurricane Katrina provided the perfect

political circumstance for amending the law; however, no amendment ever passed
Congress.
Mann and Ornstein (2006) point to an amendment offered by Rep. Jackson-Lee
(0- TX) on the original legislation while in committee that would have allowed victims of

natural disaster to avoid these filing problems, but the amendment was rejected without
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debate by a voice vote (pp. 142).

Although Mann and Ornstein (2006) claim this

legislation requires amending, all the proposed amendments failed, even after Hurricane
Katrina when there was bi-partisan congressional and popular support for an amendment
that would waive the means testing requirement for victims of natural disaster (Walsh
and Atlas, 2005).

In fact, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee Rep.

Sensenbrenner argued there was not a need for an amendment because the law contains
plenty of provisions to account for Katrina victims and encouraged people to "get over it"
(Walsh and Atlas, 2005).

Only days after Sensenbrenner's statement, and two weeks

before the law was set to take effect. the Justice Department waived the means testing
requirement for residents of Southern Louisiana and Mississippi affected by the storm,
although some still argued the mandatory financial counseling should have also been
waived (New York Times, 2005).
The evolution of this legislation does resemble Mann and Ornstein's diagnosis of
Congress subordinating institutional identity to party identity, but Mann and Ornstein's
representation of the bankruptcy reform process is misleading. The House and Senate
presented distinct versions of the legislation and in many floor votes attained strong
bipartisan support in the Senate, though House versions of the legislation were more
divisive and conference committees were repeatedly unsuccessful.

Although the

Republican leadership attempted on many occasions to thwart the legislative process with
procedural sleight of hand, they were not as successful as Mann and Ornstein (2006)
suggest, which is evidenced by the length of time the legislation spent in Congress. In
fact, the strong institutional identity of the House and Senate creates and interesting

l~

dichotomy in Congress, which preserves a deliberative legislative process despite party
unity or unified control of government.
There are competing explanations for the peculiar manner in which this
legislation became public law. Zywicki (2003) argues this legislation is the result of a
policy pendulum swinging back in favor of creditors. after years of expansion of the
Bankruptcy system.

In Zywicki' s estimation, the Bankruptcy reform in 1978 shifted

policy to a liberal extreme, and thus even if Democrats were in control of Congress
during this period, the policy would have made a similar change. Mann and Ornstein
(2006) also highlight the absence of "experts" in the drafting of this legislation as
evidence of institutional decline.

Zywicki (2003), however, rationalizes that the

traditional "experts" in bankruptcy reform are the same judges and lawyers that gain
professional dominance and security from the expansion of bankruptcy laws and
consultation with this constituency would be limited in any reforms constricting the
system.
The only explanation for the eight-year stalemate on bankruptcy reform is the
failure of the House and Senate to negotiate a compromise that both chambers could
accept.

Binder (1999) provides the best explanation for this institutional breakdown

resulting in the long period of debate. Mann and Ornstein (2006) provide an explanation
for the passage of the final version of bankruptcy legislation, but cannot account for the
years leading up to the final passage of reforms.

Kingdon allows for this bicameral

disagreement by including the concept of "softening" on issues into his model, but the
punctuated equilibrium model is unable to account for this observable fact.
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METHODOLOGY:

This thesis applies collected data to two models of policymaking and two
Congressional decision making models. The policymaking models are: Kingdon's (1995)
revision of the "garbage can model" and the punctuated equilibrium model developed by
Baumgartner and Jones (1993). The two Congressional decisionmaking models are the
institutional model offered by Binder (1999) and the partisan model described by Mann
and Ornstein (2006).

The analysis will take place in three parts: identification of

Democratic and Republican interpretive packages, a determination of the media salience
of packages, and an analysis of Democratic and Republican principles in key pieces of
legislation.
To determine the underlying perspective of each party, this study incorporates a
"signature matrix" developed by Gamson and Modigliani (1989). The signature matrix
includes metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989).

These five framing devices describe the various argumentative

strategies political elites use to frame issues. The signature matrix also includes roots,
consequences, and appeals to principle. These reasoning devices analyze the ideological
foundations of interpretive packages to further differentiate the Democratic and
Republican perspectives.
To assess the relative media salience of the various frames, news articles were
collected from the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal. and USA
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Today and coded to identify to which frame they belong. The news articles in this study
attempt to represent the total population of news content (not editorials and commentary)
discussing the provisions of consumer bankruptcy legislation in either house of Congress
or waiting for Executive Branch approval, between October 1, 1997 and April 20, 2005.
The unit of analysis is each paragraph.
This study identifies three media-sponsored frames in addition to the frames
included in the elite interpretive packages. The three new frames are the anti-lobbying,
Republican obstructionist, and the Democratic obstructionist frames.

The additional

frames in this section emerged during the coding process and were included to add
nuance and explanation to this study.
The anti-lobbying and Republican obstructionist frames are included in the
Democratic narrative and the Democratic obstructionist frame is included in the
Republican narrative. Although many of the anti-lobbying issues developed in the media
attack Democrats as well as RepUblicans, it is part of the Democratic narrative because
those employing it always use it to attack the reform measure in Congress.
The Republican and Democratic obstructionist frames refer to comments in news
articles attacking one of the groups for using unfair tactics to delay the legislative
process.

The Democrats were the focus of most of these remarks in reference to

attaching controversial amendments to legislation to delay and obstruct debate.
RepUblicans are also susceptible to attack, however, with suggestions that the majority is
abusing procedural mechanisms, mostly in the House, to restrict amendments and debate
on the legislation.
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There are three layers of coding for each article.

After each paragraph is

identified as representing either a pro-debtor (PO), anti-lobbying (AL), women's issue
(WI), Republican obstructionist (RO), pro-system (PS), personal responsibility (PR),
economic effect (EE), or Democratic obstructionist (DO) frame, the article is assigned a
(I) for representing a Democratic narrative, (0) for neutral articles, and (-1) for those

articles representing a Republican narrative. A ( 1) is assigned to an article if a majority
of the coded paragraphs represent the Democratic frames (PO, AL, WI, or RO) and 20%
of the total paragraphs in the article represent the Democratic frames. A (-I) is assigned
to an article if a majority of the coded paragraphs represent the Republican frames (PR,
EE, or DO) and 209c of the total paragraphs represent the Republican frames. Within
these groups dominate frames arc assigned if one particular frame represents 20% or
more of the total paragraphs and greater than 509c of the coded paragraphs.
A second reader established inter-coder reliability at 72f7c for the newspaper
coding procedure. The nine selected articles represented 10.23lf'c of the 88 total articles
and 10. 719C of the 1.541 total paragraphs. The selected articles include three articles
from the New York Times, and two articles from the Washington Post, USA Today, and
Wall Street Journal. Although the inter-coder reliability statistic is low, only one article
coded by the second reader changed dominant frame and no article was coded to reflect a
different ideological perspective.
In the case of bankruptcy reform, the text of the legislation remains remarkably
consistent in each chamber; however, each chamber produced substantively different
legislation. The legislation offered by the Senate is more moderate and less expansive in
scope than the legislation offered by the House.
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To account for this difference, this

analysis will code each piece of legislation according to the underlying ideological
perspective. Using the signature matrix as a tool, this project identifies six key areas of
dispute in the National Bankruptcy Review Commission report and places the policy
outcomes suggested by the majority of the Commission and the dissenters within the
respective party narratives. The recommendations of the majority of the Commissioners
correspond to the Democratic package, while the recommendations offered by the
dissenters correspond to the Republican package.
Every piece of substantive legislation will receive a code between (0), for a piece
of legislation representing purely Democratic principles and (I) if the legislation
incorporates purely Republican principles.

Each code will represent the ratio of

Republican principles present in the legislation and only those principles listed above will
be coded.

The coding will include evidence from the text of the legislation and the

substance of amendments.
The six key issues disputed in the National Bankruptcy Review Commission report
and the legislation in Congress and codes the presence of each of the policy outcomes
that develop from the narratives in each piece of substantive legislation. The seven key
issues and resulting policy outcomes are below:
1. Fraud: Democratic legislation deals with debtor abuse with financial penalties
through the bankruptcy system Republicans argue for imposing criminal penalties
on debtors.
2. Means Testing: Democrats favor the judicially administered version that requires
the consent of the debtor to convert a case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13
Republicans prefer the formulaic means testing.

3. Exemptions: Democratic reforms attempt to balance federal exemptions and
create a uniform standard Republicans prefer residency requirements for
exemptions.
4. Priority of Unsecured Creditors (Ch 7): Democrats argue that raising the priority
status of unsecured creditors increases the competition families have to face to
collect family support obligations. Republicans argue that the priority status of
unsecured creditors is irrelevant because judges have more freedom in Chapter 7
cases to distribute payments to creditors and families will always be considered
more favorably.
5. Repetitive Filings: Democrats once agam prefer a judicially administered
restriction Republicans support a clear prohibition for a period, generally 10 years
on a Chapter 7 case and five years on a Chapter 13 case.
6. Predatory Lending: Democratic reforms include an emphasis on controlling
predatory lending practices Republican reforms do not identify lending practices
as a cause of bankruptcy and therefore do not address this issue.
This study also includes an analysis of the committee consideration of each piece
of legislation and data from major roll call votes.

Information about the committee

consideration of legislation is collected from House and Senate reports and varies from
bill to bill.

The roll call voting data consists of eleven votes in the House of

Representatives. incorporating four procedural votes and seven substantive votes. In the
Senate. the analysis contains 13 votes, including six procedural votes and seven
substantive votes.

2-1-

The votes included in this study will include major actions, which include final
floor votes on rules to consider the le£islation.
'-. cloture votes in the Senate , and final floor
votes on the legislation.

The analysis will include a discussion of the amendments

proposed and incorporated into the various versions of the legislation, but due to the
expansive substantive nature of amendments, a quantitative analysis of votes would be
less revealing for this project. Data from the roll call votes is gathered from Thomas, the
online database for the Library of Congress.
The institutional model proposed by Binder (1999) suggests that the ideological
difference between the chambers is the strongest indicator of gridlock. Since the unit of
analysis in this study is the piece of legislation. Binder's hypothesis is tested by
determining the percentage of Republican reforms included in each piece of legislation.
According to Binder's research, the larger the difference between the bills proposed by
each chamber, the more difficult it will be to pass the legislation. This study predicts that
Binder's hypothesis will hold true for bankruptcy reform.
Mann and Ornstein' s (2006) hypothesis that partisan struggle provides the best
explanation for the bankruptcy reform, is tested through an analysis of roll call votes.
Mann and Ornstein (2006) portray the bankruptcy reform process as one in which the
majority party excludes minority party perspectives from the policy formation process
and majority views dominate the legislation. Mann and Ornstein (2006) suggest partisan
outcomes of roll call votes will reflect this one-sided control of the policymaking process.
This study disagrees with Mann and Ornstein' s (2006) hypothesis and predicts that there
will not be consistent partisan floor votes on bankruptcy legislation.
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Kingdon (1995) hypothesizes that policies are successful when process streams
couple. The three process streams identified by Kingdon (1995) are: the problem stream,
the policy stream, and the political stream (pp. 90-115).

The two streams this study

focuses on are the policy stream and the political stream.

This study assumes the

recognition of bankruptcy as a policy problem in Congress initially occurred because the
NBRC acted as a feedback mechanism for Congress. In order to measure the strength of
the policy communities in the policy stream, this study analyzes the evolution of
legislative proposals and the percentage of Republican reforms included in each piece of
legislation. This study uses the analysis of the media salience of frames as an indicator of
the national mood and interest group representation in Congressional committee hearings
to provide evidence of the political stream.
The application of this case study to the punctuated equilibrium model is
somewhat problematic because studies employing this model generally study longer time
frames.

However, the indicators Baumgartner and Jones (1993) offer should still be

apparent in the policy adoption phase of the policymaking process. This study focuses on
three indicators suggested by Baumgartner and Jones: media attention, policy outputs,
and partisanship.

It is not necessary to include venue access in the discussion of this

analysis because the legislative proposals were on the legislative agenda in Congress for
the entirety of the study and there was no shift in venue. Unfortunately, there is little
objective research available analyzing the nature of the bankruptcy problem. The NBRC
report includes statistics, but due to the controversy surrounding the report those statistics
were not incorporated into the study. The inclusion of objective information about the
extent of the bankruptcy problem during this period would enhance this research. Data
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collected by the U.S. Courts is available in a consistent formant only since 2001,
although information provided by both sides of the debate indicates a sharp increase in
personal bankruptcy filings beginning in 1996 (Anderson, 2003, pp. 148-152).
The primary indicator relied upon by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) is media
attention. This study will measure the media attention by the salience of Democratic and
Republican frames in news articles. The content of legislative proposals will measure
policy outputs, and an analysis of the partisan influences in roll call voting is included to
account for contextual changes.
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ANAL YSIS OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN FRAMES:

The purpose of this study is to compare two models of Congressional
decisionmaking and two models of policymaking to the bankruptcy reform process. The
two Congressional decisionmaking models are the institutional model and the partisan
model, and the two policymaking models are the garbage can model and the punctuated
equilibrium model.

The primary disagreement between the two Congressional

decisionmaking models is whether the source of gridlock is the ideological distance
between the House and the Senate or partisanship. The policymaking models disagree on
the influence of outside actors on the formation of legislative policy the most important
outside actor is the media. The data collected in this project on the salience of frames in
the media and the percentage of Republican reforms included in each legislative proposal
rely on the existence of a clear difference between Democratic and Republican arguments
on bankruptcy reform.
The following signature matrix clarifies the interpretive packages employed by
the Democratic and Republican parties.

The Democratic package includes three

identifiable frames: a pro-system frame, women' s issue frame, and a pro-debtor frame.
Even though these frames are distinct, Democratic elites generally combine the three
frames when developing their arguments in floor speeches and Congressional reports.
The Republican package focuses on the personal responsibility frame, which emphasizes

on the moral aspects of filing for bankruptcy; and the economic effect frame, focusing on
the impact of increased bankruptcy filings on the overall US economy.

Table 1
Signature Matrix for Elite Interpretive Packages of Bankruptcy Reform:

Metaphors

Exemplars

Catchphrases

Depictions

Democratic Package:

Republican Package:

Pro-System Frame
Women's Issue Frame
Pro-Dehtor Frame
Pro-System:
One-size-fits-all bankruptcy;
Women's Issue:
Victims of bankruptcy;
Pro-Debtor:
Traps: debtor's prison.
Enron and the collapse of
pension systems across the
country; bankruptcies caused
by unemployment and lack of
health insurance; increases in
the number of credit
solicitations: increases in
credit solicitations targeted at
college students; credit card
companies are making record
profits.
Pro-System:
Arbitrary means testing;
presumption of abuse;
Women's Issue:
Deadbeat parents; protect
children not creditors;
Pro-Debtor:
Fresh stan; one bad diagnosis
away from financial disaster.
Pro-System:
People in unfortunate
situations \vill be treated the
same as people who are
abusing the system.
Women's Issue:
Competition with unsecured
creditors will make it more
difficult for families to collect

Personal Responsibility Frame
Economic Effect Frame

29

Personal Responsibility:
Walking away from debt;
opportunistic debtors;
Economic Effect:
free riders.
Anecdotal stories of individual
debtors taking advantage of
the bankruptcy system:
increases in the number of
bankruptcy filings over the
past 20 years; increases in the
amount of consumer debt in
the past 20 years.

Personal Responsibility:
Needs-based bankruptcy;
balance needs of creditors and
debtors;
Economic Effect:
Bankruptcy is no longer a last
resort; spendthrifts.

Personal Re,sponsibility:
Consumers defrauding the
bankruptcy system; creditors
suffering because of lax
rulings by bankruptcy judges
handicapped by restrictions in
laws and lack of investigative
resources;
Economic Effect:

Visual Images

Roots

Consequences

payment on child support and
alimony debts.
Pro-Debtor:
Debtors buried with paperwork
and the increased number of
priority creditors under the
new law will put debtors in the
same financial position after
discharging debts because of
the increased cost of filing for
bankruptcy and the limitations
on what debts are
dischargeable.
Pro-System:
Judges will be unable to
respond to the individual needs
of cases; lawyers will be
reluctant to take on cases due
to the increased liability.
Women's Issue:
Families unable to collect
alimony and child support
from deadbeat parents because
a proportion of future income
will go to priority unsecured
creditors.
Pro-Debtor:
Debtor who has health
insurance at the time of
diagnosis of disease, but
because of illness loses job and
therefore their health insurance
and becomes strapped with
tens of thousands of dollars of
debt.
The increase in bankruptcies in
the past 20 years is due to
failures of the economic
system rather than the failures
of individuals. Populist
ideology.

Individuals should not be
punished during bankruptcy
proceedings, they should be
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Middle income, honest,
consumers unable to find
mortgages to buy homes and
unable to attain credit at
affordable rates.

Perso11al Responsihility:
Consumers loading up credit
cards with luxury items and
then filing bankruptcy and
discharging all the purchases;

Ecol1omic EfFect:
Loss of the "American Dream"
for the middle class because of
huge default rates on credit,
middle class America will no
longer to be able to afford
houses and cars.

The increase in bankruptcies in
the past 20 years is due to an
increased cultural acceptance
of bankruptcy; people who file
for bankruptcy should feel a
sense of moral shame.
Conservative moralistic
ideology.
Individuals who file for
bankruptcy should have to pay
back whatever they can afford

A ppeals to Principle

educated if necessary, but debt
incurred at no fault of the
debtor should be
dischargeable. There should
be more restrictions placed on
creditors engaging in unfair
lending practices.
Corporations are more likely
to abuse the bankruptcy
system, and with greater
detriment to the economy than
individual consumers.
People should not be punished
for finding themselves in
unfortunate circumstances.

Analysis olDemocratic

regardless of the reason for
incurring the debt. The current
bankruptcy system offers too
many advantages to debtors;
therefore, this legislation needs
to add more provisions in the
interest of creditors.
Consumer abuse of the
bankruptcy system is
damaging to the economy.

People have a responsibility to
pay for the debts they incur. It
is immoral to exploit creditors
by not repaying them the
promised amount.

Packa~e

The Democratic pro-system frame is generally used to address the development of
a "means test" for Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers included in post- I 994 reforms. Democrats
have labeled the means test as "arbitrary" and "one-size-fits-all bankruptcy."

Barack

Obama summarized the frame nicely in a floor speech. "This bill would take us from a
system where judges weed out the abusers from the honest to a system where all the
st

th

honest are presumed to be abusers," (Congressional Record, 109 Congress, 1 Session,
March 2, 2005, S 1904). The means test included in this legislation is the first means test
to be included in bankruptcy law. With this frame, Democrats argue that the legislation
is "tying the hands of judges" because it includes far too many specifics. Below, Senator
Feingold uses aspects the pro-system frame to portray the reforms pertaining to lawyers
as unfair to both attorneys and debtors (Congressional Record. 105

th

Congress, 211d

Session, S 10568):
Mr. President. section 102(A)(3) of S. 130 I. the section of the hill that would make a
debtor's attorney responsihle for the costs and the fees of the trustee if the attorney loses a
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707(h) motion and the chaptcr 7 filing if it is found npt to he 'suhstantially justified' is a
very trouhling provision. [ ... J Thcrc certainly i~ ~omc ahusc hy ~omc dchtors' altofl1eys.
Howcvcr. this provision docs not runish thc altofl1eys. It actually punishes their clients.
This provision, Mr. Prcsident. in effect. will dcny dchtors their right to he representcd hy
counscl. What it will do is dcny dehtors any meaningful access to chapter 7 of thc
hankruptcy codc. Thcrefore, ultimately, this provision will have the effect of denying
dchtors cqual access to ju~tice.

Democrats also developed a women's issue frame that discusses the bankruptcy
legislation in terms of its effect on women and children.

This frame argues that the

reforms in the legislation will make it more difficult for families to collect alimony and
child support payments because of the increased number of creditors that given "priority"
status. In 1994 and previous bankruptcy reforms "priority" status was reserved for taxes
and family support, the post-1994 reforms expanded the types of debts considered nondischargeahle. Therefore, debtors will he responsible for paying more types of creditors
and families will he less likely to collect the same amount of money they would have
under the pre-reform laws. In addition, because the reforms lengthen the period of time
of payment schedules it is difficult for judges to accelerate payment of alimony and child
support to families struggling to make ends meet.

Increasing the difficulty of the

bankruptcy process for individuals also hurts debtors who are trying to get back on their
feet and support their families. Senator Kennedy used this frame in the passage below
1h

(Congressional Record, 106 Congress, 2

nd

Session, SI1447):

Under thc pcnding hill~, credit card companics arc givcn a ncw right to compete with
womcn and children for the hushand's limited incomc aftcr hankruptcy. It is true that thc
hill movcs support payments to thc first priority rosition in the hankruptcy code. But that
only matters in thc limitcd numher of cascs in which the dchtor has assets to distrihute to
a creditor. In most caseS--(l\cr 95 pcrccnt--there arc no assets. and thc list of prioritics has
no effect. Thc claim of "first priority" is a sham to conceal thc rcal prohlem--thc
compdition for resourccs after hankrurtcy. Thi~ legislation crcatcs a new category of
deht that cannot hc discharged aftcr hankruptcy--crcdit card dchl. It will. thcreforc,
crcatc intcnse competition for the former hushand\' limitcd income. Undcr current law,
he can dcvotc his post-hankruptcy income to mccting his hasic rcsponsihilities, including
his studcnt loans. his tax liahility. and his surrort paymcnts for his former wife and their
children. But if this hill hccomes law. one of his so-called "hasic" responsibilities will be
a ncw one--to Visa and MasterCard. Wc all know what happcns when womcn and
children arc forccd to competc with these sophisticated lenders--they always losc.
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Another aspect of the reform debate related to the women's issue frame is not
incorporated into the table because it only became integrated into the text of one piece of
legislation, is known as the Schumer abortion amendment. The amendment makes legal
judgments non-dischargeable under bankruptcy law for activists who damage abortion
clinics. Senator Schumer offered this amendment on nearly all versions of the legislation
beginning in 1999.

The wording of the amendment took various forms and actually

passed the Senate in 2002 after collaboration with Senator Hatch.
1h

Senator Reid

summarizes the amendment below (Congressional Record, 106 Congress, 2

nd

Session,

S 11466):
It said that these people--these very. in my ()pinion. evil people. who go to clinics where
women come to get advice--some people may not like the advice they get in these clinics
hecause some of the advice results in ohtaining an ahortion. But we live in a free
country: people haw the right to go where they want to go and talk ahout what they want.
What these women are doing is lawful. not illegal. People ~pray chemicals into those
facilities. and they can't get rid of the stench for up to 1 year. and many times they have
to simply tear the insides of the facility down so it can he reused. In this legislation.
Senator Schumer and I said if you do that. you cannot discharge that deht in hankruptcy
as a result of the damages incurred. \\ hether to the facilities or those women who use
those facilities.

The two main issues addressed by the pro-debtor frame are the additional
"priority" creditors and whether debtors are able to pay their bills or not. This frame
argues the additional paperwork required under the legislation and the increased
responsibility for lawyers to ensure the statements of their clients are true make it more
expensIve and more difficult for debtors to file for bankruptcy.

Senator Kennedy

employed the language of the pro-debtor frame below (Congressional Record, 109
Congress, 1,1 Session, S 1836):
Yet this legislation turns its hack on that spirit of American entrepreneurship. II tells our
citizens that the) cannot get that fresh start unless they can maneuver through a maze of
procedural ohstacles created hy the credit card companies and deht collection agencies. It
imposes paperwork hurdens that hankrupt Americans can not afford. II forces them to pay
for credit counselors. who may he predatory themsehes. It forces them to miss work to

1h

go to audits of their meager assets. It requires them to hire a lawyer to mitigate this
maze. but then tells the lawyer that any error will make the lawyer personally liable. In
short. this bill does e\erything the mind of the purveyors of predatory plastic could think
up to make their cardholders pay in full. and prevent them Ii·om getting the "fresh start"
that bankruptcy offers them. Its purpose is to keep the credit card payments rolling in.
and prevent that money fi·om heing used to feed their children or pay their hospital bills
or make their mortgage payments. It labels them as abusers of the system.

Toward the second point, the pro-debtor frame also focuses attention on the
increase in the cost of medical care that drives people into bankruptcy for reasons outside
their control.

Elizabeth Warren, former reporter for the National Bankruptcy Review

Commission

(NBRC),

said

In

testimony

to

the

Senate

Judiciary

Committee,

"Overwhelmingly, American families file for bankruptcy because they have been driven
there-largely by medical and economic catastrophe-not because they want to go there.
Your legislation should respect that harsh reality and the families who face it." This is
the most common frame when attempting to provoke visual images.
Despite these differences. these frames are all interconnected. They share many
important aspects of Democratic ideology and lead to the same conclusions. Democrats
also used similar historical examples to oppose bankruptcy reform.

In the post-200!

debate, Enron became the most powerful example for Democrats of corporate excess in
bankruptcy and consumers being taken advantage of.

Senator Kennedy utilized these
th

examples in the 2005 debate (Congressional Record, ! 09 Congress.

l't

Session, S 1836):

This is supposed to be a bill about spendthrifts. about people who abuse the credit system
and abuse the bankruptcy system. If that were really what this bill was about. maybe
there would be some reason for us to be here. If this \\ere a bill that dealt with the truly
incredible abuses of the bankruptcy sy'item that we have seen in the Enron case. in the
WorldCom case. in the Adelphia case. and the Polaroid case in my own State. then
maybe there would be reason to he spending our time working on this bill.

However. there was also a community in the Democratic Party that targeted the credit
card companies. emphasizing the increases in profits and seemingly random solicitations
for "pre-approved" credit cards.

The primary uniting factor for the Democratic package is the populist ideological
foundation supporting the belief that the system should make it easier for the people with
the fewest resources to file for bankruptcy. This is distinguishable from the Republican
argument because Republicans argue that the amount of debt a person has is important,
but the reasons for incurring the debt matter too. The theme of the Democratic package
is the failures of the economic system create a far more widespread problem than the
failures of individuals. The visual images espoused by each of the frames offer examples
of individuals who are trapped in debt because of the increased cost of filing for
bankruptcy, increased health care expenses, and greedy creditors. Thus Democrats tend
to argue for increased debtor education. full dischargeability of medical expenses,
restricted lending practices, and restrictions on corporate bankruptcies.

Analysis

(~f Republican

Package

Republican elites in Congress have a more focused frame than the Democratilc
elites, focusing primarily on increasing the personal responsibility of individual debtors
and to a certain extent corporations and lenders. Senator Hatch uses this emphasis on
st

th
personal responsibility during debate in 2005 (Congressional Record, I09 C ongress, 1

Session, S 1842):
Let me say with regard to credit card Lieht. I think it is a nice. populist appeal here. tll
hlame all the credit card companies for the prohlems everyhody has in our society today.
Look. we have an intelligent society. a highly educated society. and I think everyhody
knows when they take those credit cards and the) accrue deht. they arc supposed to repay
that deht. Frankly. we have far too many people taking advantage of credit cards and not
paying their deht.

Republicans argue that there is an increased cultural acceptance of bankruptcy,
which has led to increases in filing and abuse of the system. One of the arguments in the
personal responsibility frame is that the bankruptcy system requires a balance between
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the needs of creditors and the needs of debtors. The revolutionary reforms in 1978 were
too lax and made it too easy to file for bankruptcy, which has accelerated the decline of
moral shame associated with the bankruptcy process. Senator Grassley, a central figure
in the bankruptcy debate and a sponsor of many versions of reform legislation, is one of
the entrepreneurs of this argument. The following is a statement he made on the floor of
the Senate in 1998 (Congressional Record, I05 th Congress, 2

nd

Session, S9952):

In the opinion of this Senalllr. of cour~e. one of the main bankruptcy crises is. as I just
stated. the overly liberal hankruptcy law of 1978. Remember. since 1978 I have had
hundreds of people tell me it is too easy to get into hankruptcy. And it shouldn't he that
easy. I have not had one person tell me that it ought to be easier to get into hankruptcy.
And I even haw had some people tell me who have heen through hankruptcy that it is too
easy to get into bankruptcy. That sort of attitude of the public is what is behind the 68
percent nationally and the 78 percent of the people in my State in polls who say the
bankruptcy laws should be reformed. Quite simply. current law discourages personal
responsihility. I want to say that again. Current law actually discourages personal
responsibility. As a result. bankruptcy has become a first option. not as a last resort for
many with financial difficulties. Bankruptcy is seen as a quick and easy way of avoiding
deht. Bankruptcy is nmv a matter of cllnwnience rather than a matter of necessity. The
moral stigma that used to be associated with not being able to pay your debt is now
almost completely gone.

The Republican personal responsibility and economic effect frames portray
debtors as opportunistic and taking advantage of the system and creditors alike. Many of
the stories told by Congressional elites depict upper middle class professionals hiding
assets and filing for bankruptcy to discharge huge amounts of credit card debt.
Republicans argue the reforms they suggest are not intended to increase the difficulty for
debtors who are poor and suffering; it attempts to close loopholes that the wealthy and
upper middle class filers exploit and to provide judges with the tools necessary to stop the
abuse. The economic effect frame argues that bankruptcy reform is necessary because
responsible consumers are suffering as a result of fraudulent bankruptcy filings.
Representative Dooley [D-CA] provided this statement in the 1999 debate (Congressional
Record, 106th Congress, 1st Session, H2639):

Mr. Speaker. today we are going to he considering hankruptey reform legislation, and I
rise in strong support of it. In ll)l)~ we had ~tudies that showed that at least $3 hillion was
written off in hankruptcy hy wealthy dehtors who eould have afforded to pay it hack.
More and more wealthy Americans are using the hankruptcy system to huy a throwaway
lifestyle that they cannot afford. then expecting hard-working Americans who pay their
hills each month to pick up the tah. That is not right. and Congress needs to do something
ahout it.

Rep, Dooley's statement illustrates the stance of many Democrats and Republicans that
the increases in bankruptcy filings are due to an increase in abuse of the system. It also
exploits the most popular visual image employed in the personal responsibility frame:
wealthy consumers discharging debt incurred buying luxury items, Dooley's argument
also includes aspects of the frame that forecast damage to the entire economy because of
the bankruptcy boom. This visual image is also used by Rep. McInnis [R-CO] in a
statement made in the 1998 debate (Congressional Record, 105

th

Congress, 2

no

Session,

H4343):
Bankruptcy was always intended to he for a person who ran into unintended
consequences who could not pay their hills to gi\ e them a new chance on life. Now what
we have seen is we hene seen that overwhelmed hy the hankruptcy of convenience.
These hankruptcies of C(lnvenience. initiated, hy the way, from ahusers of our hankruptcy
laws, are having a \ery harmful impact on our Nation's competitiveness. The current
system is unfair to all people who are fiscally responsihle, who are penalized in the form
of higher prices, credit card rates. interest rate increases. In other words, the people who
do pay their hills have to carry the load for those who do not pay their hills.

With this statement Rep. McInnis describes the type of economic damage bankruptcy
abuse imposes on the economy: less access to affordable credit.
An important part of this frame i-. the contention that much of the economic boom
in the 1990's was made possible by easy access to credit. which lead to an increase in
consumer spending and job growth.

However, with millions of consumers now

defaulting on their debts with easy access to the bankruptcy system, creditors will have to
increase interest rates on loans and credit cards because of the increased risk of debt
evasion. The crux of the economic effect frame is that the bankruptcy system should be
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available to those who need it, but access should be restricted to only those who need it to
limit the negative impact of the recent rise in bankruptcy petitions. Although this frame
places some responsibility for the increase in filings on creditors, they agree with the
personal responsibility frame that many of the debtors filing for bankruptcy can afford to
repay at least some of their debts.

Many of the economic effect frame sponsors also

suggest that it is too easy to file for bankruptcy and even though some families do need
the system, it should be made difficult for them.
Thus, the source of the disagreement between the Republicans and Democrats on
bankruptcy reform is the question of who is responsible for the recent increase in filings:
creditors or debtors?

This disagreement leads the two parties to divergent policy

outcomes concerning the direction reform measures should take.

Democrats wish to

preserve consumer protections, while Republicans are interested in reversing the harm of
the 1978 legislation, by increasing the oversight for debtors filing for bankruptcy relief
and limiting the generous provisions included in the 1978 legislation.

ANAL YSIS OF MEDIA FRAMES:

The garbage can model and the punctuated equilibrium model disagree on the
importance of the agenda setting role of the media.

Baumgartner and Jones (1993)

emphasize the consequence that negative media attention can have on a policy subsystem
and the resulting legislative outputs.

The punctuated equilibrium model suggests the

media can act as agents of change by undermining confidence in the traditional policy
community.

On the other hand, Kingdon (1995) claims outside actors have a limited

impact on the policymaking process, the garbage can model focuses instead on the power
of internal actors.

Kingdon (1995) argues that outside actors are not effective agenda

setters, but can be powerful agenda blockers. Media and interest group actors are capable
of blocking policy alternatives from the agenda although they are not successful at
suggesting alternatives for legislative consideration.
To assess the media salience of the frames. news articles were collected from four
national newspapers: the New York Tillles, Washington Post, Wall Street journal, and

USA Today. To select articles from the New York Times, Washington Post, and USA
Toda)', I searched the Lexis-Nexis database for articles relating to "consumer bankruptcy"
and "bankruptcy reform"; for aJ1icies from the Wall Street journal, 1 searched the

Proquest database with comparable search terms. The search yielded 127 articles from
the New York Times, 132 articles from the Washington Post, 71 articles from the USA

Today. and 81 articles from the Wall Street journal. This study only included "hard"

news stories (no editorials or letters to the editor) and only news stories about a particular
piece of legislation. Thus, only 88 total articles are coded in this project, 28 from the
New York Times, 18 from the Washington Post, 19 from USA Today, and 23 from the
Wall Street Journal.
Each paragraph received a code to identify to which package it belongs.

The

news articles in this study attempt to represent the total population of news content (not
editorials and commentary) discussing the provisions of consumer bankruptcy legislation
in either house of Congress or waiting for Executive Branch approval, between October
I, 1997 and April 20, 2005.

There are three layers of coding for each article. Each

paragraph is identified as representing a pro-debtor (PD), anti-lobbying (AL), women's
issue (WI), Republican obstructionist (RO), pro-system (PS), personal responsibility
(PR), economic effect (EE), or Democratic obstructionist (DO) frame.

Each article is

also assigned a (I) for representing a Democratic narrative, (0) for neutrality, and (-I) for
representing a Republican narrative. A (I) is assigned to an article if 20% of the total
paragraphs in the article represent the Democratic frames (PD, AL, WI, RO, or PS) and a
majority of the paragraphs coded represent the Democratic frames. A (-I) is assigned to
an article if 20'7c of the total paragraphs represent the Republican frames (PR, EE, or DO)
and a majority of the coded paragraphs represent the Republican frames. Within these
groups dominate frames are assigned if one particular frame represents 20% or more of
the total paragraphs and greater than 50'7c of the coded paragraphs.

Table 2
Percentage of Total Paragraphs Representing News Codes

Frame

Percentage

Pro-Debtor
Anti-Lobbying
Women's Issue

14.47gc
8.11 '7c

2.08'7c
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Pro-System
Republican Obstructionist
Personal Responsibility
Economic Effect
Democratic Obstructionist
Not Coded
Total Democratic Frames
Total Republican Frames

0.58';[
0.52';[
7.727c
1.437('
1.43';[
63.66';[
25.76(lr
1O.587c

The table above summarizes the total results from the coding. Of all paragraphs
included in the study, 63.66';( did not receive a code. This is because this study only
coded biased news content and much of the news content reported on this issue was
neutral. Much of the coded content is information quoted from sources, what Callahan
and Schnell (200 I) and Terkildsen et al. (1998) refer to as "source cues." One possible
factor that may skew the analysis is that the Wall Street Journal tends to use a different
structure for its stories, which includes longer paragraphs. However, much like the other
newspapers,

Wall Street Journal stories generally do

not incorporate different

perspectives into the same paragraph.

In the analysis of only the coded por1ion of the newspaper paragraphs, it becomes
much more apparent that the pro-debtor frame is the most media salient, while the prosystem and Republican obstructionist frames seldom appear in the media.

The most

salient Republican frame is the personal responsibility frame, representing 21 % of coded
paragraphs, but it is only the third most salient frame included in this study.

Table 3
Percentage of Coded Paragraphs Representing News Codes

Frame

Percentage

Pro-Debtor
Anti -Lobbying
Women's Issue
Pro-System
Republican Obstructionist
Personal Responsibility

39.827('
22.32';(
5.717c

41

1.61';(
1.437c
21.25';[

Economic Effect
Democratic Obstructionist
Total Democratic Frames
Total Republican Frames

3.939(;
3.939C
70.89CfC
29.11CfC

Figure 1 shows the distribution of individual news frames for each paper. It is
clear that the pro-debtor frame is the most salient news frame of all the coded paragraphs
in the articles, representing 37'lc of coded paragraphs in the Washington Post articles,
39% in the New York Times, 44% in the USA Today, and 42% in the Wall Street Journal.
The other Democratic frames also fare well in the distribution of news coverage, the antilobbying and women's issue frames appear to be relatively salient frames as well.
The most salient Republican frame is the personal responsibility frame, which
represents 189C of coded paragraphs in the Washington Post, 230/c in the Nnv York Times,
24% in the USA Today, and 199C in the Wall Street Journal. The economic effect and the
Democratic obstructionist frame reach similar percentages of the coded paragraphs in
each newspaper, but never rise above single digits.

Figure 1:
Distribution of News Frames for Individual Newspapers
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Figure 2, illustrates the percentage of coded paragraphs acknowledging either a
Democratic or Republican issue frame.

Seventy-one percent of all coded paragraphs

have a Democratic frame; 29% of coded paragraphs represent Republican frames.
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Figure 2:
Distribution of total Democratic and Republican Frames for total Newspaper Articles
News Frames

Figure 3, is a representation of the frequency of Democratic and Republican
frames over time. There appears to be no trend in media coverage as predicted in the
punctuated equilibrium model. Each of the spikes on the graph correspond to periods
when the legislation was active in Congress and the Republican frames, which appear
with increasing frequency in the legislative process, appear less frequently in the media.
Since most of the coded paragraphs reflect source cues, the media is relying on the
traditional bankruptcy experts, such as bankruptcy judges, law professors and consumer
groups, rather than the new creditor interests gaining support in Congress. Therefore,
media actors neither possess agenda setting power on this policy nor reflect the policy
community gaining support in Congress.
Figure 3:
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This chapter suggests that Kingdon's (1995) garbage can model is a better
representation of the policymaking process of bankruptcy reform due to its emphasis on
internal actors. The punctuated equilibrium model relies on the existence of negative
media attention to explain policy reversals, however, this data does not support that
hypothesis. Overall, the media did not seem to playa significant role in the formation
and adoption of bankruptcy reform.
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ANAL YSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

This chapter will focus on important aspects of the legislative proposals
including: committee consideration, ideology represented by each proposal, and the roll
call votes. Data collected on the committee consideration will identify the groups that
Congress considers experts on bankruptcy to provide evidence to assess the political
stream in Kingdon's (1995) garbage can model.

The identification of the ideology

represented by legislative proposals is necessary to analyze the distance between House
and Senate proposals to assess Binder's (1999) institutional model of Congressional
decisionmaking.

This information is also helpful in analyzing the partisan model

suggested by Mann and Ornstein (2006) to determine whether minority perspectives are
included in the legislative process.

The primary source of evidence for the partisan

model is from the floor votes recorded in the House and Senate.

Backg round
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. PL 103-394. is the starting point for the
major reforms debated in later Congressional sessions beginning in 1997.

This

legislation was proposed to clarify portions of the bankruptcy code established in 1978, in
particular parts of the legislation dealing with \\'hen the automatic stay is applicable (CRS
Summary. H.R.5116-103

rd

Congress. Sec. 116. Sec 218. Sec. 304). Another reason for

the legislation was to expand the bankruptcy code to apply to bankruptcies of
international corporations.

The most notable reform offered in the legislation is the

-+7

creation of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (CRS Summary, H.R.5116rd

103 Congress, Title V).
The consumer reforms that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 did contain were
mostly Democratic.

Title I of the Act permits an extension of the automatic stay

protections under certain circumstances and increases the amount of debt consumers can
possess when filing for bankruptcy under the Chapter 13 reorganization (CRS, 1994, Sec.
1(8). Under Title III, the portion of the legislation dealing specifically with consumer
bankruptcy issues, Chapter 13 debtors can cure a lien against their principle residence
until the sale of the property and the legislation includes language excluding family
support obligations from the automatic stay or any judicial injunction (CRS, 1994, Sec.
304).

The language goes even further to make any judicial lien against a debtor's

property for family support payments unavoidable (CRS, 1994, Sec. 304).

The

Republican reforms included civil and criminal penalties for fraudulent bankruptcy
filings (CRS, 1994, Sec. 308, 312).
Because of the technical nature of this reform, there was little discussion of it on
the floor and less dissention. HR 5116 passed the House on October 5, 1994, the Senate
on October 6, 1994, and President Clinton signed the legislation into law on October 22,
1994 (Thomas, H.R.5116-103

Id

Congress). The bill passed both houses of Congress

with a voice vote (Thomas, H.R.5116--I03

ld

Congress).

Rep. Jack Brooks [D-TX],

Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. sponsored the legislation, with Rep.
Hamilton Fish [R-NYJ and Rep. Michael Synar [D-OK] co-sponsoring (Thomas,
H.R.5116-103 rd Congress). Other than the sponsors of the legislation, only two other

Representatives made floor statements on the bill: Rep. Howard Berman [D-CA] and
Rep. Louise Slaughter [D-CA]. Both spoke in support of the legislation.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC) largely viewed its role as
"fine-tuning" the bankruptcy code. and instructions in the House and Senate Reports
accompanying the legislation creating the Commission made clear that Congress was for
the most part pleased with the performance of the bankruptcy code (H.R. Rep. 103-835,
pp. 59; S. Rep. 103-168, pp. 54). The Commission's purpose was simply to update the
laws to incorporate nev, legislation and developments in the economy (NBRC, 1997, pp.
50-51).

The legislation permitted the President to appoint two members to the

Commission and the Chair (NBRC, 1997, pp. 55). The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court abo appointed two members with the remaining four members appointed by the
majority and minority leadership of each house of Congress (NBRC, 1997, pp. 55).
President Clinton appointed Chair Brady Williamson (NBRC, 1997, pp. 55).
On October 20, 1997. the Commission released its long awaited, 1,300-page
report. Although the Commission was non-partisan and its membership included mostly
judges, lawyers, and accountants. the Commission' s proposals were extremely divisive.
The Commission approved the report in a 5-4 vote and the consumer bankruptcy
recommendations included were primarily pro-debtor.

The last chapter of the report

included statements from the dissenting Commissioners and a 156-page statement on the
consumer bankruptcy provisions that included additional recommendations to prevent
abuse and fraud in the bankruptcy system.

The joint statement by the dissenters

emphasizes a personal responsibility frame that accentuates the role of social stigma and
shame in preventing bankruptcy (NBRC, 1997).
Lcndcrs c\ cry\\ here arc reporting an

increa~e

,,)9

in thc numher of hankruptcy petitions filed

b) people who were current em their debt payments. This phenomenon implies that
bankruptcy relief is too easy to obtain. that the moral stigma once attached to bankruptcy
has eroded. and that debtors are insufliciently counseled both about personal financial
management and about the use of bankruptcy. (pp. 10-+-+)
One creditor went ~o far as to describc the bankruptcy system as "lcgaliLed theft." Others
have suggested that it can be a "haven for criminal," and creates significant opportunities
to defraud creditors. This group of proposals tightens up the accuracy of the schedules
and statements of affairs and facilitates notice tll creditors by requiring a list of the
debtor's account number,. (pp. 10-+-+)
One basic defect in the Framework is philosophical. The Framework is based upon two
major assumptions: first. that debtors are financially disadvantaged through no fault of
their own: and second. that debtors are inadequately represented in the bankruptcy
process. From these two assumptions come the Framework'~ inevitable conclusion: that
as a matter of social justice. it is necessar) to le\ el the playing field by insuring that
debtors are treated better under the reformed Code than they were before. A.I a result,
II1l1ch oj the Fmmell'Ork can be c/wrL/cteri;ed a.1 social engineering designed to
redistribute \I'ealth, rather thun bunkl'/lptC\ refcJr/lI. (Italics added. pp. 1116)

The recommendations supported by the majority of Commissioners represent
principles adopted by the Democratic Party. The Republican Party adopted the principles
represented by the dissenting group of Commissioners, which are noticeably broader and
more far-reaching than the reforms offered by the majority.
Opponents of bankruptcy reform in Congress often denounce the legislation's
sponsors for not incorporating all of the recommendations from the NBRC report that
Congress itself commissioned.

Supporters of reform regularly call into question the

objectivity of the report and cite the division among the Commissioners as evidence of
ideological influence in the recommendations. Thus, the NBRC report served to fuel the
debate over bankruptcy reform rather than providing solutions. The NBRC report also
provides a foundation for the two most media-salient frames in the consumer bankruptcy
debate: personal responsibility vs. pro-debtor. This study assumes that the NBRC report
functioned as a feedback mechanism to goad Congress to recognize bankruptcy as a
problem in need of reform.
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Committee COl1sideratiol1
At the first hearing, held on April 11. 1997, the Subcommittee of Administrative
Oversight and the Couns of the Committee on the Judiciary heard testimony from five
witnesses: Michael E. Staten, Director of the Credit Research Center, Purdue University;
Ian Domowitz. Professor of Economics at Northwestern University; Edward Bankole,
Vice-President, Moody's Investors Service; Kim Kowalewski, Chief. Financial and
General Macroeconomic Analysis Division, Congressional Budget Office; and Michael
McEneney, National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition (US Senate Report 105-253, 1998,
pp. 30).

At the second hearing, held on October 21. 1997, witnesses represented the

NBRC: Brady C. Williamson. Chair: Hon. Roben E. Ginsberg, Vice-Chair, U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge: M. Cald\vell Butler; Jim Sheppard; Hon. Edith Hollan Jones; John
Gose; Babette Ceccotti; and Jay Alix (US Senate Repon 105-253. 1998, pp. 30). The
third hearing took place on March II. 1998 and heard from three panels (US Senate
Repon 105-253, 1998. pp. 31).

The first panel included representatives from the

bankruptcy system. the second panel included representatives from organizations
protecting consumer interests, and the third panel included primarily law professors and
scholars studying bankruptcy reform (US Senate Report 105-253, 1998, pp. 31). All of
the interests represented above are the traditional experts in bankruptcy policy.

The

hearings did not include testimony from either business interests or the credit industry.
The subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts reported the bill
favorably with a 6-1 vote (US Senate Report 105-253. 1998. pp. 32).

Republican

Senators Thurmond [R-SC]. Kyl [R-AZ], Sessions [R-AL], and Grassley [R-IA] voted
for the bill along with Democratic Senators Durbin [D-ILJ and Kohl [D-WI] (US Senate
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Report 105-253, 1998, pp. 32). Senator Feingold [D-WJ] cast the only vote against the
measure (US Senate Report 105-253, 1998, pp. 32).
Thirteen amendments were debated in the judiciary Committee with eight
accepted, two deferred for floor consideration, and three defeated (US Senate Report 105253, 1998, pp. 32). The two amendments offered by Senator Specter [R-PA], which dealt
with filing fees for indigent filers and attorney's fees in frivolous lawsuits, both failed in
votes of 9-9 (US Senate Report 105-253, 1998, pp. 32-33). For the first amendment,
regarding the release of filing fees for debtors unable to pay, all the Democratic
committee members and Senator Specter [R-PA] voted in favor and the remaining nine
Republican members voted in opposition (US Senate Report 105-253, 1998, pp. 32).
Senator Specter's second amendment, charging the debtor's attorney all court costs and
attorney's fees in frivolous lawsuits. received Senator Thompson's [R-TN] vote in favor
and Senator Kennedy's [D-MAJ vote in opposition (US Senate Report 105-253, 1998, pp.
32-33).
The committee accepted seven (mostly technical) amendments by unanImous
consent (US Senate Report 105-253, 1998, pp. 33-34).

The only exception was an

amendment offered by Senator Durbin [D-IL] disallowing claims from lenders in
violation of the Truth in Lending Act (US Senate Report 105-253, 1998, pp. 33). The
only amendment to pass with a roll call vote was an amendment from Senator Abraham
changing the treatment of liens in cases convel1ed from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 (US
Senate Report 105-253, 1998. pp. 33). The amendment passed with a 10-7 vote Senators
Leahy [D-VT]. Kennedy [D-MA]. Biden [D-DEJ, Kohl [D-WI], Feinstien [D-CA],
Feingold fD-WIJ. and Durbin [D-ILJ voted against the legislation, Senator Torricelli [D-
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NJ I voted in favor of the amendment and Senator Specter failed to vote (US Senate
Report 105-253. 1998. pp. 33). The Judiciary Committee reported the hill favorably with
a 15-2 vote Senators Feingold [D-Wlj and Kennedy [D-MA] voted against the legislation
and Senator Feinstein [D-CA] did not vote (US Senate Report 105-253. 1998. pp. 34).
The House Suhcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held four
hearings between March 10. 1998 and March 19. 1998 and heard testimony from over 60
witnesses (US House Report 105-540. 1998. pp. 61-63).

While the House heard

testimony from the same interests included in the Senate hearings. the House also
incorporated testimony from the banking and credit industry. which was largely missing
from the Senate consideration.

The House Subcommittee on Commercial and

Administrative Law passed H.R.3150 by an 18 to 10 vote (US House Report 105-540,
1998. pp. 68). All twelve amendments proposed in committee failed (US House Report
105-540. 1998. pp. 63-68). The committee reported the bill favorably with a vote of 1810 (US House Report 105-540, 1998. pp. 68). Democratic Representatives Boucher [0Y A] and Rothman [D-NJ] voted against the amendment and five Republicans and four
Democrats rai led to cast votes (US House Report 105-540, 1998, pp. 68). The House
Committee on Judiciary also filed a written report released on May 18. 1998.
In

the

106

1h

Congress.

the

House

Subcommittee

on

Commercial

and

Administrative Law conducted four additional hearings on H.R. 833. one of which was a
joint hearing with the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and Courts (US
House Report 106-123, 1999. pp. 95). At the joint hearing, the committee heard from
nine witnesses. six of which were representing the interests of creditors (US House
Report 106-123, 1999, pp. 95). The House Subcommittee conducted three more hearings

between March 11. 1999 and March 18, 1999 and heard testimony from nearly 70
witnesses from 23 organizations, including both traditional and creditor interests (US
House Report 106-123, 1999, pp. 95-97).
In the House Judiciary Committee markup offered 29 amendments, only ten of
which passed (US House Report 106-123. 1999. pp. 98-109).

The Representative

Jackson Lee [D-TX] amendment to allow states to opt out of the homestead exemption
passed on a vote of 18-15 (US House Report 106-123. 1999, pp. 99).

Sixteen

Republicans and t\vo Democrats joined together to pass the amendment (US House
Report

106-123,

1999.

pp,

99).

The

two

Democratic

Representatives

were

Representatives Jackson Lee [D-TX] and Wexler [D-FLJ. both hailing from states with
unlimited homestead exemptions (US House Report 106-123. 1999. pp. 99), Twelve
Democrats and three Republicans voted against the legislation (US House Report 106123. 1999, pp. 99).

The three Republicans were Representatives Hyde [R-ILJ,

Sensenbrenner [R-WIJ, and Pease [R-INJ (US House Report 106-123, 1999, pp. 99). The
committee reported the bill favorably by a vote of 22-13. no Republicans opposed the
measure, and only two Democrats voted for the legislation, Representatives Boucher [DVA] and Rothman [D-NJ] (US House Report 106-123. 1999, pp. 106).
The Senate did not hold additional hearings. except the aforementioned joint
hearing with the House (US Senate Report 106-49, 1999. pp. 15).

There was an

extensive committee markup session with over twenty-five amendments proposed,
including Senator Schumer's abortion amendment.

Only nine of the amendments

received favorable consideration and those were either technical or specialized in nature;
none affected the major compromises in the legislation (US Senate Report 106-49. 1999,

5-1-

pp. 15-18).

The bill was reported favorably by the committee with a 14-4 vote (US

Senate Report 106-49, 1999, pp. 18-19). Senators Biden [D-DEJ, Kohl [D-WIJ, Feinstein
[D-CAJ, and Torricelli [D-NJ] joined with the Republicans on the committee to vote in
favor of the bill (US Senate Report 106-49, 1999, pp. 18-19). Senators Leahy [D-VTJ,
Kennedy [D-MA], Feingold [D-WI], and Schumer [D-NY] opposed the legislation (US
Senate Report 106-49, 1999, pp. 18-19).
On February 7, 2001 the lOill Congress House Judiciary Committee heard from
Kenneth Beine, Credit Union National Association: R. Bruce Josten, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce; Phillip Strauss. California District Attorneys Association and the California
Family Support Council: and George Wallace, The Coalition for Responsible Bankruptcy
Laws (US House Report 107-3,2001. pp. IS). All of the witnesses testified in favor of
the legislation (US House Report 107-3. 2001. pp. 15).

On February 8, 2001, the

Committee heard testimony from those witness in opposing the bill. The witness list
included Charles Trapp, a former chapter 7 debtor; Ralph Mabey. National Bankruptcy
Conference: Professor Karen Gross, New York Law School; and Damon Silvers, AFLCIa (US House RepOJ1 107-3,2001. pp. 15-16).
During the committee markup. fifteen amendments were proposed and debated,
but only two passed (US House Report 107-3, 2001, pp.

16-22).

Chairman

Sensenbrenner proposed the two passing amendments, both technical in nature (US
House Report 107-3,2001, pp. 16-22). The first passed by a vote of 22-0, and the second
passed by a \ote of 21-0 (US House Report 107·-3, 2001. pp. 21-22). The committee
reported the legislation favorably by a vote of 18-9; the only Democrat to vote for the bill
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was Representative Boucher [0-VA], although seven Democrats and three Republicans
neglected to vote (US House Report 107-3,2001, pp. 21-22).
The House Committee on the Judiciary in ,the 108 th Congress held one hearing on
March 4, 2003 and four witnesses testified representing the Department of Justice and
organizations of creditors (US House Report 108-40, 2003, pp. 136-137). None of the
nine amendments offered in committee passed, and the legislation proceeded to the floor
by an 18-11 vote (US House Report 108-40.2003. pp. 137-145). Representative Boucher
[D-VA]. who previously supported the bill, did not cast a vote and no other
Representatives caq crossover votes from either the Republican or Democratic Party (US
House Report 108-40.2003, pp. 137-145).

171e Bankruptcy Abuse Prei'ention ond Consumer Protection Act

(~l2005

in the

1h

109 Congress spent just over two months in Congress before President Bush signed it
into law. Although the votes in both houses indicate bi-partisan agreement, this is not
necessarily the case. Senator Grassley introduced the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 in the Senate

011

February 1. 2005. On February 10,

the Senate Committee on the Judiciary began hearings and received testimony from eight
experts representing the different interests affected by bankruptcy legislation.
Testimony came from Kenneth Beine, representing the Credit Union National
Association: Malcolm Bennett. representing the National Multi-Housing Council and
National Apartment Association; Dave McCall, representing the United Steel Workers of
American and the AFLCIO: Philip Strauss, a retired attorney from the San Francisco
Department of Child Support Services: Mike Menzies. representing the Independent and
Community Bankers of America: Maria Vullo, representing Planned Parenthood;
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Elizabeth Warren. a Professor from Harvard Law School: and Todd Zywicki, a Professor
from George Mason Law School (U.S. Senate Report 109-31. 2005, pp. 8-9).
testimony represented largely positive views of the legislation.

The

The only dissenting

opinions came from Maria Vullo who argued in favor of the abortion amendment, and
Elizabeth Warren, the former reporter for the NBRC who represented the interests of
debtors (U.S. Senate Report 109-31,2005. pp. 8-9).
Three Committee members read statements into the Congressional Record:
Senator Leahy [D-VT]. Senator Durbin [D-IL], and Senator Cornyn [R-TXJ. In a notable
change. Senator Durbin. one of the original co-sponsors of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1998 and one of the first high profile Democratic Senators to support bankruptcy reform,
made a statement opposing the legislation:
Much has changed in four years. Our nation \\as attacked by terrorists. We endured a
prolonged recession. A W,I\ e of corporate scandals shook our economy. leading to
massive layofb and nt\ aged pen~ions and -to I (k) plans. Largc corporate bankruptcies left
workers and retirees across the country with reduced wages. crippled pensions plans and
significantly reduced health henefits.

Senator Durbin' s statement went on to contend that there was a lack of evidence that
bankruptcies were continuing to rise and the recent economic downturn resulting in
increased layoffs, made this is an inappropriate time to consider bankruptcy reform
(Durbin, 2005).

Senator Leahy included his reasons for opposing the reform (Leahy,

2005):
We know who will suffer most if this hill passes: hard working. middle class families.
especially those \\ ith children. Who stands to gain') Some of the most profitable
industries in America toda): credit card companies and hanks. In 2003. credit card
companies enjo:ed a S30 million pwfit - their highe:;t profits in I S years.

Senator Cornyn's [R-TX] statement focused on the bankruptcy bill he introduced
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the Senate that added tougher restrictions on venue changes for corporations seeking

bankruptcy relief (Cornyn. 2005).

Despite these objections. Senator Cornyn [R-TXJ

S7

voted for the bill when it was up for final passage in the Senate. The legislation emerged
from committee markup with only five amendments added (U.S. Senate Report 109-31,
2005, pp. 9):
I.

2.
~.

4.
5.

Senator Edward Kennedy [D·MA) elarif) ing that a dehtor'~ reasonahly necessary
expenses for health insuralCe. disability in~urance. and health ~avings accounts
for thc dehtor and for the dehtor' s spouse and dcpendents are allowed expenses
under the hill" s needs-hased test:
Senat(lr Kennedy limiting retention honU',cs. severance pay. and other payments to
insiders of the dehtor. under certain circumstances:
Senator Russell Feingold [D-WI] increasing thc monetary threshold with respect to
the \ enue of a proceeding Ll reCl)\ cr a consumer deht:
Senator Patrick Leahy I D- VTj clarifying that a deht hased on a Federal or statc
securitics law violation is lwndischargeahlc: and
Senator Kennedy requiring tl e United States trustee to apply to the court for the
appointment of a chapter I I trustee if there arc reasonahle grounds to suspect
li·aud. under certain circullhtallces.

The mostly technical nature uf the amendments was stark when compared to the
amendments introduced on the floor of the Senate, demonstrating a great deal of restraint
on the part of the Committee mem bers.

This led to reports that a there was a deal

between House and Senate leadt'rship to speed the legislation through without
amendments to ensure its final passage, which Republican leaders in both houses do not
deny (Morgenson and Labaton, 2005).
On February 17, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary ordered a favorable report
of the bill to the Senate by a vote of 12-5 (U.S. Senate Report 109-31,2005, pp. 9).
Although the report does not specity who voted against the legislation, the five votes
probably came from Senators Kennedy [D-MAj, Feingold [D-WIj, Leahy [D-VT],
Durbin [O-IL], and Schumer [O-NYj, all of whom voted against the final version of the
legislation on the floor.

Senators Kennedy [O-MA] and Feingold [0- WIJ opposed the

legislation primarily because of ih failures to provide what they viewed as sufficient
security for the debtors who are not abusing the system, Kennedy [D-MAJ went so far as
to call it "mean spirited and unfair." (U.S. House Report, 1998, pp. 79-92).
5R

Senator

Leahy [0-VT] in addition to his opposition mentioned earlier. did not support the bill
because of the removal of the "abortion amendrnenf" language, its failure to include
exceptions for military personnel, and concerns about ensuring the security of debtor's
personal information (Leahy. 2005). Senator Durbin's [D-IL] primary criticism of the
bill was that he does not believe there was a problem with the current system, arguing
that the vast majority of debtors who filed for bankruptcy did so because of medical bills
or other circumstances beyond thelr control and Congress should not place additional
obstacles for people seeking relief (Durbin. 2(05).

Senator Schumer [D-NY], as

mentioned before. opposed the bill because it did not include the language of the
"abortion amendment" drafted for tbe 1999 legislation (Stolberg, 2(05).
The Senate hearings in the 105

th

Congress represented the last time the credit

industry would be absent from hearings. During the same period, the House held four
hearings all of which included representatives from the credit industry.

In the 106

1h

Congressional session the Senate only conducted one hearing which was a joint hearing
with the House Committee on the Judiciary, of the nine witnesses, six were
representatives of the credit industry. The House held three additional hearings all of
which included the traditional bankruptcy experts and credit industry representatives. In
h

the 10i Congress. the House only held two hearings one representing the traditional
bankruptcy interests and one representing creditor interests. There was only one hearing
th

th

in the 108 Congress and only one hearing in the 109 Congress. The House hearing in

2003 represented both consumer and creditor interests and the Senate hearing in 2005
included almost exclusively creditor interests. Only two of the eight witnesses testified in
opposition to the legislation.

SL)

Analysis olPolicy Proposals
Binder (1999) argues that the ideological distance between Congressional
chambers is the best predictor of gridlock. Since this study uses the piece of legislation
as the unit of analysis rather than the individual legislator, this project applies a coding
scheme to determine the percentage of Republican reforms. The analysis will compare
the percentage of Republican reforms included in legislative proposals introduced in each
chamber.
Table 4 summarizes the substance of the legislative proposals analyzed in this
The bills S.1301, H.R.3IS0, and H.R.31S0c ("c" is meant to identify the

project.

proposal as a conference report on the bill). were introduced in the 10S th Congress.
H.R.833, S.62S, and H.R. 2415. were introduced in the 106th Congress, and in the 107th
Congress, H.R.333, S.420, and H.R.333c \vere introduced.
apiece introduced in the 108

th

and 109

th

There was only one bill

Congresses: H.R.97S and S.2S6, respectively.

The Senate bills represent increasing percentages of Republican reforms, while House
bills are more inconsistent.

Conference rep0l1s (listed in italics) include H.R.31S0c,

H.R.241S, and H.R.333c; they do not always reHect a compromise between the

legislation introduced in the two chambers.

Table 4
Summary of Substance of Legislative Proposals
Bill
SUO I

Fraud 'leansTest Exempt Ch7USC
()
0
0
I
J

0
1
0

0

1

1

()

0

I

I

0
1

0.5
0.5

1
1

HR315()

()

0

1
1

1
1

1

HR3150c

HR833

()

1

S625

()

HR2415
HR333

1
1

RepFiling PredLending

60

Code

0

16.677r

1
()

83.33%
50%
5()%

I

()

5()!lr

1
1

0
0

58.33%
75%

S420

]

()

IHR333c

1

J

HR975

1

1

S256

]

]

s:~.:rv/(

]

]

0

0.5

1

J

()

75%

0.5

1

1

0

75%

0.5

]

]

0

7S?r

0.5

Although both the House and Senate bills in the lOS

th

Congress focused on

consumer bankruptcy issues, there were major and controversial differences between the
two pieces of legislation. The Senate legislation incorporates the institution of financial
penalties for debtors found making fraudulent claims (S.1301. Title II. Section 201-20S).
An amendment offered by Senator Kyl [R-AZ] reinforced this measure by making debts
incurred through a fraudulent bankruptcy filing nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases.
The Senate agreed to the amendment in a voice vote (US Senate Report lOS-2S3. 1998,
pp. 31).

Legislation in the HOLlse requires civil punishments for fraud and contains

similar monetary penalties to the Senate version of the bill (H.R.31S0, Title I, Section
143).

House legislation also included a provision to make fraudulent claims

nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases (H.R.31S0, Title I. Section 143).
Many Senate Democrats portrayed the House legislation as draconian because of
the strict means test it attempted to impose. Under the House legislation a debtor cannot
file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy if their household income for the six months before filing
their bankruptcy petition is more than the national median income. their monthly net
income is more than fifty dollars. and they are capable of repaying 20% of unsecured
debts (H.R.31S0. Title I, Section 101). The Senate bill also includes a means test, but the
Senate proposed a judicially administered test which would allow a judge to require a
debtor to change his or her filing to Chapter 13 if they can repay 209c of their general,
unsecured debts (US Senate Report IOS-2S3. 1998, pp. 24).
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The three Republican reforms included in the Senate legislation were the capping
of exemptions and the increasing the priority level of unsecured creditors in Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 cases.

An amendment offered by Senator Kohl [R- WI] during

subcommittee markup capped the homestead exemption at $100,000; the subcommittee
adopted the amendment by unanimous consent.

The original legislation in the House

included a $100,000 cap on the homestead exemption (H.R.3150, Title I, Section 182);
however, a floor amendment offered by Rep. Gekas [R-PA], struck the language and
denied the exemption to those buying homes within a year of filing for bankruptcy
(H.Amdt.666. H.R.3150). The amendment passed by a vote of 222-204 (Roll Call No.
221; June 10. 1998).
The Senate bill also increased the priority level of unsecured creditors in both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases by making certain unsecured debt nondischargeable
(S.1301. Title III, Sections 302. 305. 310-311. 314-319. 321). Democrats argued these
reforms made it more difficult for families to collect family support obligations due to
increased competition \\'ith creditors.

Section 314 of the legislation made restitution

awards nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases. and Sections 315-316 add to the list of
nondischargeable debts in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases: all debts incurred in order to
pay nondischargeahle debts and all debts incurred 90 days before filing for bankruptcy.
The House legislation attempted to distribute payments to unsecured creditors throughout
the lifespan of a Chapter 13 repayment schedule (H.R.3150, Title I, Section 1:(2). The
House also incorporated similar language adding certain creditors to the list of
nondischargeable creditors (H.R.3150. Title L Section 14 J - J 43, J 44-150).
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Instead of prohibiting repetitive filings, the Senate version of the legislation
"discourages" them (S.1301, Title III, Section 303).

Under the legislation,. there is a

presumption of "bad faith," which required the debtor to file additional paperwork
demonstrating a need for bankruptcy, rather than a prohibition on a certain group of
debtors. The House version of the bill included identical language as the Senate version
to discourage repeat filings

(H.R.3150, Title L Section 121); however, the House

expanded on this language and added a prohibition of repeat Chapter 7 filings within 10
years and Chapter 13 filings within .5 years (H.R. 3150, Title I, Section 171).
The Senate legislation also provided several consumer protection provISIOns,
prohibiting claims from creditors in violation of the Truth in Lending Act (S.130 I, Title
II, Section 206). Consumer protections were adapted in the House legislation with the
creation of a "Debtors Bill of Rights," \vhich required the preparer of any bankruptcy
petition to provide debtors with information concerning the consequences of filing for
bankruptcy, but the legislation did not restrict the practices of creditors (H.R.3150, Title
I, Section I 15).

In the 1061h Congress, the two legislative proposals introduced for consideration
were H.R.833, in the House of Representatives and S.625 in the Senate.

H.R. 833

punished fraudulent filings with monetary penalties within the bankruptcy system
(H.R.833, Title VIII, Section 807). The Senate legislation does not address penalties for
fraud.
The means testing procedure implemented in this legislation resembled versions
in earlier legislation. If in the six months prior to filing a bankruptcy petition: a debtors
household income is above the national median, the debtor has over $100.00 monthly net

Income, and they are capable of repaying at least 20Sle of their unsecured debts, a
petitioner is ineligible for a Chapter 7 discharge (H.R.833. Title L Section 1(2). In the
Senate version of the legislation the means testing ultimately relied on a judicial
determination, though the bill stated there is a presumption of "bad faith" if the debtor
can repay the lesser of S I 5,000 or 25Slc of debts (S.625, Title

L Section

102).

The exemptions included in H.R. 833, capped the amount of money a debtor can
claim; however, it also provided an opportunity for states to opt out of this measure
(H.R.833, Title L Section ]47).

The original cap was set at $100,000, but in

subcommittee markup an amendment offered by Representative Delahunt increased the
cap to 5250,000 (US House Report 106-123. 1999. pp. 378).

The legislation also

included a residency requirement of 730 days before a claimant can receive an exemption
(H.R. 833. Title 1. Section 126). In a change from the previous Senate legislation, the
Senate version of the bill included a residency requirement of 730 days before a debtor
qualified for state exemptions rather than a cap (S.625. Title III, Section 3(7).
Similar to the earlier versions of the legislation, H.R.833 increased the priority of
unsecured creditors incurred to pay nondischargeable debts (H.R.833, Title 1, Section
146).

The language in the Senate legislation is more complicated.

It extended

nondischargeability status to all debts incurred within 70 days of filing for bankruptcy
and all debts incurred to pay nondischargeable debts with the intent of then discharging
them (S.625, Title III, Section 314). The only exception to this exemption was all debt
incurred to pay family support obligations would be considered dischargeable under the
proposed legislation (S.625. Title III. Section 314).
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The House legislation included language similar to the conference report on
1h

H.R.3J50 in the 105 Congress, which presumed "bad faith" on filings occurring within
one year of each other; however, the ultimate decisionmaking power resided with the
judge in these cases (H.R.833, Title I, Section 117). Conversely, the Senate legislation
included a prohibition of filings, extending the time limit to eight years for Chapter 7
cases and five years for Chapter 13 cases (S.625, Title III. Section 312).
H.R.833 took steps to require creditors to provide more information about finance
charges and interest for those debtors choosing to make only minimum monthly
payments on their bills (H.R.833. Title I, Section 112). The measures meant to deter
predatory lending practices were more rigorous in the Senate legislation. For creditors
proved to not reasonably participate in negotiations, fail to credit payments received, or
attempt to coerce an agreement can have their credits reduced by up to 20% and are
subject to damages and payment of legal fees (S.625, Title II, Sections 202-204).
1h

In the 107 Congress. both the House and the Senate legislation included a clause
instructing the Attorney General and Federal Bureau of Investigation to enforce criminal
penalties on those participants in the bankruptcy system making false or misleading
statements in petitions and addressing abusive reaffirmation agreements (H.R.333; Title
II, Section 203; S.420. Title II. Section 203).
The House version of the legislation replaced the presumption of abuse in
H.R.24l5. with a mandatory presumption of abuse when the debtor failed to meet the
requirements specified in the means test (US House Report 107-3.2001. pp. 27; H.R.333,
Title I, Section 102). A debtor would not qualify for Chapter 7 bankruptcy if the debtor's
monthly income, after expenses. multiplied by 60 was greater than the lower of: (I) 25%
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of the debtor's non-priority unsecured claims or 56,000; or (2) $10.000 (H.R.333, Title I,
Section 102).

The Senate preserved the judicially administered means test with a

presumption of abuse if a debtor did not meet the qualifications of the above formula
(S.420, Title 1, Section 102).
House and Senate legislation both included a 730-day residency requirement
before a debtor would qualify for state exemptions (H.R.333, Title III, Section 307;
S.420, Title III, Section 307). The Senate legislation also included a $125,000 cap on
property acquired more that two years before the bankruptcy filing (S.420, Title III,
Section 308). The House legislation on the other had capped the homestead exemption at
$125,000 for property acquired 1,215 days before filing a bankruptcy petition (H.R.333,
Title III, Section 322).
Both the House and Senate bills made debt nondischargeable ensuing from
restitution or civil damages against the debtor for willful or malicious injury that resulted
in either personal injury or death (H.RJ33, Title III, Section 314; S.420, Title III, Section
314). The House and Senate used identical language in this section to ban successive
Chapter 7 filings for eight years after the first Chapter 7 case (H.R.333, Title III, Section
312; S.420, Title Ill, Section 312). The legislation also prohibited Chapter 13 filings if in
the previous three years a debtor filed a Chapter 7, II, or 12 case or another Chapter 13
case within the two previous years (H.R.333, Title Ill, Section 312; S.420, Title III,
Section 312).
Both House and Senate legislation contained the same language imposing both
financial penalties on creditors providing false information in bankruptcy proceedings
(H.R.333, Title II, Sections 202-205; S.420, Title II, Sections 202-205).

For the first

time, the bankruptcy legislation instructed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to pursue
criminal investigations against fraudulent actions by creditors (H.R.333, Title II, Section
203; S.420, Title II, Section 203).
th

The provisions of H.R.975, in the 108 Congress were nearly identical to those of
H.R.333.

Both bills instituted criminal penalties for fraudulent bankruptcy filings

(H.R.975, Title II, Section 203): identical means testing procedures (H.R.975, Title I,
Section 102): increased in the priority status of unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 and
Chapter 7 cases (H.R.975, Title III, Section 314), and prohibited repetitive filings
(H.R.975, Title Ill, Section 312).

Since both bills also include both Democratic and

Republican reforms for exemptions, the category receives a code of 0.5 (rather than as
either 0 or 1). The Democratic principles included in the legislation are (1) not requiring
payment of unsecured creditors throughout Chapter 13 repayment plans and (2) strict
provisions holding creditors accountable for predatory lending practices (H.R.975, Title
II, Sections 202-205).

H.R.975 contains 75CJc Republican reforms according to the

coding scheme.
The provisions of S.256 are nearly identical to those of H.R.975 and H.R.333. All
the most recent versions of the legislation institute criminal penalties for fraudulent
bankruptcy filings (S.256; Title II, Section 203). include the same means testing
procedure (S.256; Title I. Section 102) increase in the priority status of unsecured
creditors in Chapte r 13 and Chapter 7 cases (S.256: Title Ill. Section 314). and
prohibitions on repetitive filings (S.256; Title Ill, Section 312).

Since both bills also

include both Democratic and Republican reforms for exemptions. the category receives a
code of 0.5 (rather than as either 0 or I). Identical to H.R.975. the Democratic principles
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included in the legislation are: (I) not reqUlnng payment to unsecured creditors
throughout Chapter 13 repayment plans and (2) strict provisions holding creditors
accountable for predatory lending practices (S.256, Title II, Sections 202-205).

S.256

contains 757r Republican reforms according to the coding scheme.

Analysis

(~lFI()()r

Votes

Mann and Ornstein (2006) argue that the inclusion of such a large percentage of
Republican reforms and the final roll call Hites in the 1091h Congress was evidence of an
intense partisan struggle over this legislation.

This study collects roll call data from

every final floor vote on bankruptcy reform legislation to assess the validity of these
claims. The result (If this analysis suggests that Mann and Ornstein (2006) come close to
explaining

legislatih~

behavior in the House, however. not in the Senate and they cannot

explain the length of time it took Congress to pass bankruptcy legislation.
The first significant reform measure to be introduced in Congress after the 1994
reforms was S. 1301, The Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, introduced by
Senator Grassley on October 21, 1997, the day after the NBRC released its report.
Senator Durbin [D-IL] was an initial co-sponsor of the legislation: Senator Grams [RMN] and Senator Sessions [R-AL] added their support nearly a year later as the bill
gained momentum on the agenda. The Judiciary Committee held three hearings focusing
primarily on consumer bankruptcy and released a report on July 21, 1998.
On February 3, 1998. Rep. Gekas [R-PA] introduced a similar measure
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the

House with Rep. McCollum [R-FL]. Rep. Boucher [0- V A]. and Rep. Moran rD- V AJ.
Co-sponsorship in the House eventually ballooned to include a largely bi-partisan 75

members. On June 10. 1998, the House passed H.Res.462 with a vote of 251-172, which
allowed for one hour of general debate on H.R.3Is0 (Roll Call No. 218). The vote on
H.Res.462 was relatively partisan compared to other votes on bankruptcy reform, with
98';(; of Republicans voting in favor of the rule and 82S1c of Democrats voting in
opposition.

Table 5
House Vote on H.Res.462
RolI#218
R
D

I
T

Y
222

"

,\IV

T

I

]

226

9R.2]'j(

1.]]<;(
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1-I.l)~Vj(

82.'\2'1(

()

I

2.::' I

172

7
-' .-1-0';;
0
/0

206

I
433

There were eleven floor amendments in the debate, six of which passed. Among
the significant amendments was H.Amdt.670 proposed by Rep. Nadler [D-NY].

The

amendment took the form of a substitution and sought to delete the means testing
procedure

and

el iminate

the

of

sections

the

bill

making

unsecured

credit

nondischargeable. The amendment failed in a vote of 140-288 (Roll Call No. 223, June
10, 1998). The final vote in the House was 306-118, with only four Republicans not
voting (Roll Call No. 225. June 10, 1998).

Table 6
House Vote on H.R.3ls0
RolI#225
R
D

I
T

Y
222
98.2N
8-1
-10.78(;;

0
3!16

N
0

1'\V

o.oarlr

1.71"1r
'\
2.-1Y;;

117
'\ 6. sarlr
I
J/S

-I

0
9

T
226
206

I
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According to the system of coding, the House legislation represents 83.33%
Republican reforms. The only Democratic proposal incorporated into the legislation was
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the incorporation of civil penalties for fraud.

Republican proposals included in this

reform were: strict means testing. residency requirements to qualify for the homestead
exemption. increased the priority for unsecured creditors in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
cases, the prohibition of repetitive filings. and the failure to address predatory lending
practices.

This bill received the highest percentage of Republican reforms of any

legislative proposal analyzed in this case study.
The Senate debated and voted on 15 amendments when the legislation reached the
floor.

Senator Grassley proposed an amendment in the nature of a substitute, adding

sections clarifying the bankruptcy proceedings of international corporations and
municipalities, but not altering the major consumer compromises already included in the
bill (S.Amdt.3559, September 23, 1998, voice vote). The amendment did not initially
include the

negotiatl;~d

cap on homestead exemptions; however, Senator Kohl offered the

same text as a floor amendment, which passed in a voice vote (S.Amdt.3599, September
23, 1998). Senator Kennedy attempted to attach an amendment increasing the minimum
wage. A motion to table this amendment passed by a straight partisan vote of 55-44, with
Senator Glenn [D-OH] not voting.

(S.Amdt.3540, September 22, 1998, Roll Call No.

278). Eight of the proposed amendments passed, seven were tabled. Most of the seven
amendments that did not pass attempted to place increased restrictions on creditors such
as limiting the fees on A TM machines and amendments to the Truth in Lending Act. The
amended version of the bill represented the same compromises negotiated through the
committee process.
S.130 I contains

SIX

Democratic reforms: financial punishment for fraud,

judicially administered means testing, uniform federal standards for exemptions,
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"discouragement" of repetitive filings rather than prohibition, and curtailing of predatory
lending practices. The only Republican reforms present in the bill were increases in the
priority status of unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 cases. Therefore, the
coding scheme identifies S.130 1 as containing 16.677<: Republican reforms, the lowest
percentage of Republican reforms of any legislative proposal in this study.
The Cloture motion in the Senate passed in a 99- I vote on September 9, 1998
(Roll Call No. 263); Senator Brownback [R-KS] cast the only vote in opposition to the
measure. Senator Brownback expressed in floor debate a concern with the wording of
the homestead exemption.

Kansas is one of five states with an unlimited homestead

exemption, which Senator Brownback argued helps family farmers keep their property
and their career in bankruptcy proceedings (Brownback, September 23, 1998, S 1(746).

Table 7
Senate Vote on Cloture for S .130 1
Roll#263
R
D

T

Y
:'i"(
l)f).1 X'lr
,,(5

:\

NV
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I
IX2'1(

0

55

0

0

IOO.OOClr

0.00'1(
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J

0

0.00';(

45
JOO

The Senate substituted the language from S.130 1 into the House version of the
bill and the measure passed in a 97-1 vote on September 23, 1998, with only Senator
Wellstone [O-MN] voting against the legislation and Senators Glenn [O-OH] and Warner
[R-VAJ not voting (Roll Call No. 284).

Senator Wellstone opposed the legislation

because he viewed it as favoring credit card companies (September 23, 1998. S 10765):
It will encourage riskier lending hahits hy credit companies. It will lead to more credit
heing extended to poor families. It will en~ure that those families will file more
hankrupteies. It will force these families to file different types of hankruptcie~. the kind
of hankruptey that ensures that the) will never he liTe of their deht and ahle to restart

thcir li\cs.
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Senators Glenn and Warner did not express Opll110nS on this legislation
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floor

statements.

Table 8
Senate Vote on H.R.3150
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Since the Senate suhstituted its own language for the House language, the
Congressional leadership convened a conference committee to halance the positions of
the House and Senate. Conferees agreed to file their report on Octoher 7, 1998. The
House and Senate already agreed on the monetary penalties for fraudulent filings and
increasing the priority status of unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 cases.
The conference report incorporated the House means testing formula, but
preserved the right of judges to use discretion in extreme cases (US House Conference
Report 105-794, 1998, pp. 121).

For exemptions, the Senate bill included a uniform

standard, while the House favored the residency requirement.

The compromise

agreement was a two-year residency requirement before a dehtor IS eligible for the
homestead exemption (US House Conference Report 105-794, 1998, pp. 123).

The

conference report also allowed unsecured creditors priority status during bankruptcy
proceedings (US House Conference Report 105-794, 1998, pp. 121-122). However, it
did not allow payment to unsecured creditors throughout Chapter 13 cases (US House
Conference Report 105-794, 1998. pp. 121-122). Rather than incorporating the House
measures prohibiting repetitious filings, the conference report featured the Senate
version, presuming "bad faith" for multiple filers and allowing bankruptcy judges to

decide whether the case is abusive (US House Conference Report 105-794, 1998, pp.
123). The conference report also included the Senate restrictions on predatory lending
(US House Conference Report 105-794, 1998. pp. 122). According to the coding, the
conference report reflects 507c Republican principles.

Table 9
House Vote on Conference Report
Roll#506
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Despite its balance, the bill lost six votes in the House, passing on a 300-125 vote
on October 9, 1998 (Roll Call No. 506). Representative Marge Roukema was the only
Republican to oppose the legislation and did so because of the provisions increasing the
priority of unsecured creditors with respect to family support obligations (Nadler,
October 9,1998, H10237). Representative Roukema voted for the House version of the
legislation, which included the same language increasing the priority of unsecured
creditors in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 cases. The legislation did not receive another vote
in the Senate, although Senator Brownback, who voted against the cloture motion on the
Senate version of the legislation, announced his support of the conference report because
of the inclusion of a residency requirement rather than caps on the homestead exemption
(Brownback, October 9.1998, SI2147).
With bankruptcy reform reaching such an anticlimax in the 105

th

Congress, both

the House and Senate were eager to try again in a new legislative year.

The House

introduced The Bankruptcy Reform Act of J 999 on February 24, 1999, sponsored by
Representative Gekas [R-PA].

Within two months, 106 cosponsors signed on to the

House legislation 40 of which were Democrats. The Senate introduced its version of The
Bankruptcy Rej(mn Act

IA].

or 1999 on March 16, 1998, sponsored by Senator Grassley [R-

The Senate legislation actually attracted more Democratic co-sponsors than

Republican. The six Democratic co-sponsors were Senators Biden [D-DE], Torricelli [DNJl, Johnson [D-SD], Breaux [D-LA], Kerrey [D-NE], and Robb [D-VA].

The four

Republicans to co-sponsors of the legislation were Senators Sessions [R-ALJ, Roth [ROE], Helms [R-NC], and Crapo [R-IDl.
The development of bankruptcy reform in the 106

1h

Congress took a similar
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course as it did in the 105 Congress. The House passed a piece of legislation, the Senate
struck the House language and passed its own version of the legislation, but with a
provision for tax breaks for small businesses.

The tax breaks were a compromise

negotiated to compensate for the minimum wage amendment Senator Kennedy was
nearly able to attach to the legislation. The attachment of the tax provision by the Senate
made the bill unconstitutional, because all appropriations bills must originate in the
House, and there was no attempt to reconcile the differences.
Rather than giving up, on October 11. 2000 leadership in both houses struck all
the language from a State Department Appropriations bill already in conference
H.R.24IS, and inserted negotiated language on bankruptcy reform.

The bill won

approval in the House on October 12, 2000 by a voice vote and approval in the Senate on
December 7,2000, but eventually recei\Cd a pocket veto from President Clinton.
The House proposal was similar to the conference report in the 105

111

Congress

and contained SOlle Republican reforms, with identical consumer reforms as those made
in the lOS

lh

Congress conference rep0l1.

The Democratic principles in the legislation

7-1-

were monetary penalties for fraud. no prohibition of repetitious filings, and incorporation
of proposals to deter predatory lending.

The Republican principles included a means

testing formula, residency requirements to qualify for exemptions, and increased priority
status of unsecured creditors in both Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 cases.

The House

attached eight amendments to the bill on the floor. None however changed the major
compromises in the legislation.
The first vote in the House to pass H.Res.158 occurred on May 5, 1999, the
resolution provided for one hour of general debate on H.R.833.
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House Vote on H.Res.158
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The substantive vote in the House reflected less partisan influence than the procedural
vote. Despite the similarities between this bill and the conference report from the 105

1h

Congress, H.R.833 received twenty more votes from Democratic representatives than the
H.R.3J50 conference legislation.

Democrats were almost evenly divided on this

legislation with 457c voting for the legislation and 507c voting against the bill. On the
other hand. Republicans demonstrated party unity with 97.757c voting in favor of the
legislation.

Table 11
House Vote on H.R.833
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The Senate legislation also received a code of 507r Republican reforms; however,
there are some interesting changes distinguishing it from the conference report and
previous Senate legislation.

Notably. the means testing procedure included in the

legislation was more lax than in an) previous version of the bill and the severe
restrictions on predatory lending were in sharp contrast to previous House legislation. On
the other hand, the Senate placed a ban on repetitious filings, which although less
stringent than the earlier House version. is a substantial change from previous legislation.
The Democratic principles incorporated in this bill were (I) no change in penalties for
fraud, (2) judicially administered means testing, and (3) strict requirements on predatory
lending practices.

The Republican reforms included were residency requirements for

exemptions, priority level of unsecured creditors, and a prohibition of repetitive filings.
Among the numerous amendments offered on the tloor. was Senator Schumer's "abortion
amendment," which would make crimmal fines resulting from violence at abortion clinics
nondischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings. The amendment passed in a vote of 80-17
(February 2. 2000. Roll Call No.2).

All Senate Democrats voted in favor of the

legislation, with seventeen Republicans voting in opposition and three not casting votes.

Table 12
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Table 13
Senate Vote on H.R.833
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The compromise language was most similar to the Senate version of the
legislation, but the compromise language included more Republican reforms that either
the House or Senate legislation, scoring S8.33'iC on the coding scale. The Democratic
principles in H.R.24IS include judicially administered means testing (H.R.2415, Title I,
Section 102) and restrictions on predatory lending with the same language as the Senate
proposal S.62S (H.R.24IS, Title II, Section 202-203; H.R.24IS, Title XIII, Sections
1301-1310).
Republicans increased the priority of unsecured creditors (H.R.241S, Title III,
Section 314), and created a ban on repetitious filings (H.R.24IS, Title III, Section 312).
This bill also included criminal penalties for fraudulent filings by either debtors or
creditors (H.R.24IS, Title II, Section 203). The compromise legislation included both
residency requirements for debtors to qualify for state exemption and capped the amount
of the exemption at $100,000 (H.R.24IS. Title Ill, Section 307, 322). Because there were
both Republican and Democratic reforms present for the same issue, the exemption is
coded as 0.5, rather than as 0 or I. The compromise language included an extensive
section on taxes associated with the bankruptcy process. but neither the minimum wage
amendment nor the ahortion amendment, included in the Senate legislatilon, are
incorporated in this bill.
The first vote on a cloture motion for H.R.24IS on November I, 2000 failed to
pass the Senate. Neither party exhibited strong unity during this vote. which is unusual
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for procedural votes.

For the second cloture vote on December 5, 2000., 98% of

Republicans voted for the motion with 30<'k of Democrats.

Table 14
Failed Senate Vote on Cloture Motion for H.. R 2415
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Table 15
Successful Senate Vote on Cloture Motion for H R.2415
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Table 16
Senate Vote on H.R.2415
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In the final vote, 98<'k of Republicans voted in favor of the measure. This legislation
incorporated more Democratic principles than Republican; however, the bill did not
receive the same number of favorable Democratic votes as the previous Senate
legislation, scoring 14.299c on the coding scale.

Despite finally achieving success in

Congress, the bankruptcy bill went to President Clinton and received a pocket veto.
Once again, Congress was nearly able to pass bankruptcy reform legislation, but
due to President Clinton's pocket veto, the bill failed to become law. On January 31,
2001, Representative Gekas introduced H.R.333: The Bankruptcy Ahuse Preventiol1 and
COllsumer Protectioll Act of 2001, in the House. Co-sponsorship for the bill was largely
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bipartisan with 22 Democratic representatives and 45 Republicans. The House Judiciary
Committee held hearings on February 7 and 8, 2001; the committee heard from eight
witnesses representing seven organizations.
Senator Grassley introduced the Senate version of the legislation, S.420, on
March I, 200 I. Once again, the Democratic co-sponsors on this bill outnumbered the
Republican co-sponsors.

The co-sponsors included Senators Biden [D-DE], Torricelli

[D-NJ], Johnson [D-SD], Carper [D-DE], Nelson [D-NE], Sessions [R-ALJ, and Hatch
[R-UT].

On March I, 2001 the Judiciary Committee released S.420 without written

report.
The House and Senate versions of the legislation in the

lOi h

Congress were

nearly identical, differing only in their treatment of means testing. Both bills included the
following Republican reforms: institution of criminal penalties for fraudulent bankruptcy
filings, increase in the priority status of unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7
cases, and prohibitions on repetitive filings. Since both bills also included Democratic
and Republican reforms for exemptions, the category received a code of 0.5 (rather than
as either

a or

1). The Democratic principles included the exclusion of requirements to

pay unsecured creditors at the same time as secured creditors during Chapter 13 cases and
strict provisions holding creditors accountable for predatory lending practices.

The

House bill contains 75C;c Republican reforms, while the Senate bill contained 58.33%
Republican reforms. Since the conference report adopted the House version of the means
test, the conference report has the same code as the House bill, 75%.
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Table 18
House Vote on H.R 333
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On March J 4, 2001, the Senate voted on a cloture motion to end debate on S.420.
Although procedural votes tend to be partisan, 98'lc of Republicans joined with 62% of
Democrats in an evenly divided Senate to end debate on this measure. The substantive
vote following the cloture motion also reflected this bipartisanship, with 94% of
Republican Senators and 727c of Democrats voting for the measure.

This bipartisan

support was somewhat surprising since according to the coding scheme, this bill
represents the highest percentage of Republican reforms of any bankruptcy reform bill on
which the Senate has voted. The two Republican Senators who voted against S.420 were
Senator Brownback [R-KS] and Senator Hutchinson [R-TX], both representing states
with unlimited homestead exemptions and opposed to capping exemptions.

Table 19
Senate Vote on Cloture Motion for S.420
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Table 20
Senate Vote on S.420
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The vote totals from the July 17.2001 vote on H.R.333 were nearly identical to
the vote totals for 5.420, reflecting the fact that the Senate ~truck text of H.R.333 and
incorporated the provisions of 5.420. However, in the months between the votes on the
two pieces of legislation. Senator Jeffords [R-VT] switched parties, allowing the
Democrats to regain slight control in the Senate.

Despite their majority party status,

Democrats were not successful at increasing party unity.

Seventy-two percent of

Democrats voted for H.R.333, while 287c voted against the legislation. Senator Boxer
[D-CA] was the only Democrat to change her vote, switching from not voting to voting
against the bill. Both Senators Brownback [R-KS] and Hutchinson [R-TX] voted against
this bill again.

Senator Smith [R-NH] was the only Republican to change voting

positions, but he made no floor statements explaining his decision.
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Table 22
Senate Vote on H.R.333
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The conference report, which was more similar to the House legislation than the
Senate version of the bill, based on the coding procedure adopted in this study, did not
receive similar vote totals as the previous version of the legislation. The House voted on
the conference report on November 15, 2002, over a year after the original vote on the
legislation, which took place on March 1, 200 I. During that period, the bill lost 62 votes.
The strong Republican Party cohesion once noticeable in the vote also diminished with
15% of Republican Representatives not voting. The same inconsistency is apparent in
the Democratic Party votes, with 26% voting in favor of the legislation, 55% voting
against the bill, and 18% not voting at all.

Table 23
House Vote on H.R.333 Conference Report
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In another attempt to pass comprehensive bankruptcy reform legislation,
Representative Sensenbrenner [R-WI] introduced The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and

Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R.975. The co-sponsorship of this bill was not as
bipartisan as earlier versions; of the 89 co-sponsors, only 15 were Democrats. In the
th

J08 Congress, the House vote on H.R.975 was the only vote on bankruptcy reform.
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Even though the provisions in the bill were nearly identical to those contained in the
h

conference report on H.R.333 in the loi Congress, this bill attained almost twice as
much support from House Democrats. This vote also demonstrated stronger party unity
within the Republican Party, which is more consistent with previous votes excepting the
vote on the H.R.333 conference report.
The Senate in the 109

th

Congress began debate on S.256 on February 28, 2005

(CRS Bill Summary, 2005). On the same day, the White House released a "Statement of
Administration Policy," suppOlting the legislation as reported by the Judiciary Committee
(Executive Office of the President, 2005). The Senate debated the bill for nine days and
Senators offered nearly 130 amendments, only eight of which passed to be included in
the final text of the bill (U.S. Senate Report, 2005. pp. 9). Similar to the amendments
passed by the Judiciary Committee, the amendments added on the floor were primarily
technical in nature, some of which aimed to exempt disabled and active duty military
personnel. Senator Leahy did manage to pass one substantive amendment adding privacy
protections for the personal information of bankruptcy filers (U.S. Senate Report, 2005,
pp.9-1O).
The most controversial amendment in the Senate was Senator Schumer's
"abortion amendment.·' The same text, which Senator Hatch re-wrote and added to the
2001 text of the legislation in committee and passed by the Senate in 2002, failed in 2005
by a slim margin (Schumer. 2005: Stolberg, 2005).

The amendment attempted, 'To

prohibit the discharge, in bankruptcy. of a debt resulting from the debtor's unlawful
interference with the provision of lawful goods or services or damage to property used to
provide lawful goods or services," (Schumer, 2005: Stolberg. 2005). The amendment

failed by a vote of 46-53, with Senator Corzine [D-NJ], not voting. Four Republicans
broke with their party to vote for this amendment: Senators Chaffee [R-RI], Collins [RME], Snowe [R-ME], and Specter [R-PA]. Two Democrats also split from the party line
to oppose this amendment: Senators Byrd [0- WV] and Nelson [D-NE].
Among the Republicans who were vocal supporters of this language in 2002 and
changed their votes in 2005 were: Senators Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, and Sessions (Schumer,
2005). Senator Schumer also accused the Senate Republicans of opposing amendments
by Democrats to ensure the later passage of the legislation in the House (Schumer, 2005).
All the Senators named by Senator Schumer deny their support of the language, and
Senator Hatch argued that although he did assist Senator Schumer in making the
language of this amendment '"more palatable" to Republicans, he never supported the
language in the amendment (Hatch. 2005). Senator Hatch also went so far as to label the
amendment the "poison pill amendment" that would kill the legislation (Hatch, 2005).
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Table 26
Senate Vote on S.256
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S.256 finally passed the Senate on March 10, 2005 by a vote of 74-25. Eighteen
Democrats voted for the bill and no Republicans voted against the legislation. Senator
Clinton abstained from the vote despite her well-documented opposition to similar texts
of the bill in the late 1990' s when there was speculation of her involvement in the
formation of the Clinton Administration policy on the issue and during her 2000 Senate
campaign.
The House received S.256 on March 14. 2005 and referred the bill to both the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Financial Services. The Committee
on the Judiciary began markup on March 16. 2005 and on March 23, 2005, the
Committee on Financial Services waived consideration of the bill to allow it to proceed to
the floor (US Senate Report, 2005, pp. 373-375). In his first speech to the Committee
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Rep. Sensenbrenner [R-WJ] asked
the Committee to report S.256 \vithout amendments (US Senate Report, 2005, pp. 378).
Ranking Member. Rep. Conyers [D-MI] responded, "This is the first time I've heard us
urge that amendments be rejected before they've been named, identified, or offered"
(U.S. Senate Report. 2005. pp. 378).

The debate continued along these lines with

minority members of the Committee expressing their discontent at the manner in which
the majority denied their right to change the legislation (O.S. Senate Report, 2005, pp.
376-539).

In aIL the House Judiciary Committee defeated II of the amendments

proposed in markup by roll call \ote. and voice votes defeated the rest (U.S. Senate
Report, 2005. pp. 26-37).
Among the more controversial amendments defeated was an amendment offered
by Rep. Schiff [D-CA] to allow identity theft victims to file under Chapter 7 regardless of

their ability to repay the debt (U.S. House Report, 2005, pp. 30). The amendment was
defeated in a straight party-line vote of 13-15, with four Democrats and seven
Republicans not voting (U.S. House Report, 2005, pp. 30-31).
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After one day of consideration, the House Judiciary Committee ordered a
favorable report of S.256 to the House without any amendments (U.S. Senate Report,
2005, pp. 36). On April 13, 2005 the House voted on

H.Re~.. 211,

a closed rule that would

close the bill to amendments and only allow for one hour of debate. Despite the apparent
bi-partisan support of 5.256, the 227-196 vote in favor of H.Res.211 was starkly partisan.

It received only two favorable votes from Democrats and no negative votes from
Republicans.

The final House vote. however, showed once again a typical vote

distribution for this legislation.
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On April 14, 2005, the bill passed the House by a vote of 302-126. Since the
House passed the same language as the Senate, there was no need for a Conference
Committee, allowing the bill to go straight to the President. The House sent the bill to
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President Bush for approval on April 15, 2005 and on April 20, 2005, the President
signed the legislation and the bankruptcy reform bill became Public Law No: 109-8. In
his signing statement, the President reaffirmed that the law re-established personal
responsibility by allowing the bankruptcy system to be available for those who needed it,
but making it harder for those who did not need bankruptcy to gain access to the system
(Bush. 2005). Since the passage of this bill, there have been no other major legislative
attempts to reform the bankruptcy

~ystem.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This thesis attempts to analyze two Congressional decisionmaking models and
two policymaking models to explain the bankruptcy reform process from

J

997-2005.

The two Congressional decisionmaking models are: Binder's (1999) institutional model
and the partisan model suggested by Mann and Ornstein (2006). The two policymaking
models are: Kingdon's (J 995) garbage can model and the punctuated equilibrium model
developed by Baumgartner and Jones (J 993).
This data suggests that Binder's (1999) institutional model provides the strongest
explanation for the inability of Congressional leaders to reform bankruptcy policy.
1997, the Senate proposed a measure with
legislation contained 83'1c.

J 67c

In

Republican reforms while the House

This vast difference began to close by 2000, when both

chambers produced legislation containing 50% Republican reforms, however, the
conference report that President Clinton eventually pocket vetoed contained 58%
Republican reforms. This conciliation was not sustainable into future legislative sessions
because it included many outside concessions such as a minimum wage proposal and a
h

package of tax cuts. Bankruptcy began to fall off the agenda in the loi Session after
September J J, but was finally pas-;ed in 2005 after the Republicans strengthened their
majorities in both chambers.
Partisanship does contribute to the passage of the bill in the 109

th

Congress, as

Mann and Ornstein (2006) predict. but it cannot explain why the reform process took

eight years. The only evidence of partisan influence prior to 2005 was in the House roll
call votes. Partisanship did not seem to have as great of an effect in the Senate.
However there are large partisan differences in the rhetoric between the parties on
bankruptcy reform.

The Democratic narrative focused attention on individual groups

who will be hurt by bankruptcy reform.

On the other hand, the Republican narrative

concentrated on the problems of the system and the rampant fraud and abuse. The source
of this disagreement is the definition of the problem and the attribution of cause. Both
Democrats and Republicans agreed that there was a dramatic increase in the number of
consumer bankruptcy filings, and in par1icular, Chapter 7 filings, resulting in large
discharges of consumer debt, leading up to the passage of bankruptcy reform. Democrats
argue the increase in filings is due to predatory lending practices by credit card
companies and increases in the cost of health care. The Democratic narrative relies on
the premise that the failures in the economic system forced consumers into placing large
amounts of money on credit cards. Republicans maintain that individuals must be held
accountable for the debts they incur, that it is irresponsible and immoral to exploit
creditors and borrow money without intending to pay it back. The large discharges of
consumer debt have an enormous impact on the economy and the amount of credit
available for middle class debtors.
The policy reform process began in the Senate with a bill sponsored by Senator
Grassley rR-IA].

The bill contained mostly Democratic reforms and achieved a huge

margin of victory with 987c of Republicans and 9SC7c of Democrats voting in favor of the
measure.

The House bill contained much stronger language and represented 83%

Republican reforms. On the final vote in the House, 98% of Republicans voted in favor

of the bill combined with 40';( of Democrats. The conference report reflected strong
bipartisanship on the issues followed in this study, but despite 509c Republican reforms,
only 36S0 of House Democrats voted for this measure.
In the 106

th

Congress, the House and Senate measures were much closer, both

representing 509c Republican reforms, but the chambers still disagreed over means
testing and repetitive filings.

Ninety-seven percent of Republicans and 45% of

Democrats supported the legislation in the House vote; the bill attained slightly more
Democratic support than either House vote in the previous Congress. In the Senate 90S0
of Republicans supported the Senate version of the legislation along with 73% of
Democrats. The conference report actually contained a higher percentage of Republican
reforms, 58';(, than either bill included prior to the conference committee. The bill won
approval in the House by a voice vote and finally passed the Senate on December 7,2000
with support from 98S0 of Republicans and 36';( of Democrats.

However, the bill

received a pocket veto from President Clinton.
h

The 10i Congress considered another three pieces of legislation. The House
bill, H.R.333, reflected 75S0 Republican reforms, and received support from 96% of
Republicans and 449c of Democrats. The Senate legislation, S.420, on the other hand,
reflected many of the same compromises negotiated in the conference report from the
106

th

Congress and contained 58';( Republican reforms.

In the Senate vote on S.420,

949c of Republicans supported the legislation along with 72';( of Democrats. The Senate
then received the House bill, H.R.333, struck all its language and replaced it with the
Senate bill, S.420, and in the second vote 91 S0 of Republicans along with 72% of
Democrats.

The conference report contained very similar language to the House

90

legislation, H.R.333, represented 757c Republican reforms.

The resulting House vote

won the support of 847r of Republicans and 267r of Democrats.
1h

There was very little progress on bankruptcy reform in the I 08 Congress; the bill
was nearly identical to H.R.333 and represented 757c Republican reforms. There was
only one recorded vote on bankruptcy reform in the 108

1h

Congress, and it took place in

the House. Ninety-eight percent of House Republicans voted in favor of the legislation
and 44lJc of House Democrats voted against the bill. Senator Grassley [R-IA] sponsored
the identical language in the 109
Republican reforms.

1h

Congress as S.265; thus, it represented 75%

In the Senate 1007r of Republicans supported the measure with

only 407c of Democrats.

In the House,

98S~

of Republicans voted in favor of the

legislation with only 367c of Democrats. Because the House did not amend the bill, there
was no need for a c()nference report and Presidcnt Bush and signed the legislation into
law on April 20, 2005.
This analysis also demonstrates strong institutional differences between the
houses. The Senate retlects a "softening" toward policy alternati ves that Kingdon ( 1995)
A gradual increase in the percentage of Republican reforms appears in the

discusses.

legislation, but that trend also corresponds with slight decreases in support from
Democrats. As the proposals move from 16CJc (H.R.3150) to 50% (S.625), Democratic
support drops from 95 ck to 74<7r:.

However, the next vote in the Senate on H.R.2415,

which contains 58% Republican reforms, only 36% of Senate Democrats support the
legislation. The only other bill that a majority of Senate Democrats opposed was S.256
1h

in the 109 Congress, which contained 7Y7c Republican reforms and only 41 % of Senate

Yi

Democrats supported.

House votes represent much less consistency and the proposals

presented by the House are less consistent in developing policy reforms.
The Kingdon policy model seems to provide a more comprehensive explanation
for the bankruptcy reform process. The release of the controversial and divisive NBRC
report provided feedback to Congress that there was a problem with bankruptcy reform.
The only piece of legislation containing less than 50';C Republican reforms was the first
Senate bill, S.1301 introduced by Senator Grassley [R-IA] the day following the release
of the NBRC report.

All the following pieces of legislation contain at least 50%

Republican reforms.
This study measures the policy stream through the evolution of legislative
proposals. Kingdon' s adaptation of the garbage can model also incorporates the idea of
softening, which provides an explanation of the long eight-·year battle to pass reforms in
both chambers. Excluding the first House bill in 1998, which contained 83% Republican
reforms, there is a gradual increase in the percentage of Republican reforms included in
the legislation produced by each chamber. This implies a gradual strengthening of the
policy community supporting the Republican reforms.
To analyze the political stream this study uses evidence of the media salience of
frames and interest group representation in Congressional hearings.

Although the

application of media frames as an indicator of national mood was unsuccessful, the
number of witnesses in Congressional hearings expressing creditor interests increased,
which opened the pol itical stream allowing the passage of reforms. Rather than acting as
agents of change, as predicted by Baumgal1ner and Jones (1991, 1993), this finds no
evidence of a relationship between media attention and the process of bankruptcy reform.

Not only did the media fail to instigate change, they also failed to reflect the change in
the policy subsystem by continuing to rely on the traditional experts, despite their
declining presence in Congressional committee hearings.

The data on committee

consideration provides evidence for an increased presence of creditor interests in
committee hearings throughout the time frame of the project.
The punctuated equilibrium model attempts to provide an explanation for long
periods of stability in policymaking interrupted by hasty upheavals of policy
communities.

Bankruptcy reform seems a compelling case study for this particular

model. The 1978 reforms represent an "ideal type" Democratic policy with few reforms
in the years following.

In 1994. the National Bankruptcy Review Commission was

established by Congress to provide suggestions for modest reforms to the system, but
rather the NBRC provides a 1,300 page report with hundreds of recommendations and
hundreds of pages of dissent. The release of the NBRC report provides an opportunity
for the new Republican Congress to redefine the bankruptcy problem, begin the break
down of the 1978 policy subsystem. and develop a new brand of bankruptcy reform.
However, Figure 3 shows a time-series representation of Democratic and
Republican frames appearing in news stories, which is not consistent with the punctuated
equilibrium model. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) predict that as a policy subsystem
disintegrates there will be more negative policy views represented in the media. Despite
the increasing prominence of Republican reforms in legislation, newspapers did not
reflect any increase in representations of Republican rhetoric in the media. Democratic
reforms represent nearly three-fourths of all coded paragraphs, and a majority of all
coded paragraphs within each newspaper. Although the decline of Democratic legislative

proposals represents the disintegration of the policy subsystem, there is no external
evidence from the print media that the policy subsystem was destroyed.
Part of the reason for the lack of external evidence could be the broader coding
scheme adopted by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). In their research, Baumgartner and
Jones code the titles of articles for representing either a positive or a negative frame and
code all articles associated with the policy topic, rather than limiting the scope of the
articles to those discussing legislative proposals.
Both Binder

I(

1999) and Kingdon (1995) provide strong explanations for the

process of bankruptcy reform. These modeb are more successful than the partisan model
and the punctuated equilibrium model because they focus solely on internal structures
and actors.

Forces outside Congress such as elections and national mood affect

partisanship and the punctuated equilibrium model relies on the media to act as an agenda
setter.

The ideological distance between the House and the Senate provides the best

explanation of the gridlock in the bankruptcy reform process.

Kingdon's garbage can

model also can explain the bankruptcy reform process with its problem, policy, and
political streams.

The NBRC report represents a feedback mechanism after which

Congress began to redefine the bankruptcy issue. The policy stream gains intensity until
September II, 2001 and then falls on the agenda, however, since a policy community
formed and developed a solution, bankruptcy reform was able to successfully reemerge in
the 109th Congress.

The political stream shows an increase in the representation of

creditor interests in committee hearings corresponding to the increase in Republican
reforms in the legislation.
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